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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

WHAT DO AUDITORS PROMISE THEIR GOVERNMENTAL AUDIT
CLIENTS? WHAT DO GOVERNMENTAL AUDIT CLIENTS WANT?
AUDIT PROPOSAL EVIDENCE FROM GOVERNMENTAL AUDIT
PROCUREMENT PROCESSES

This dissertation, consisting of two studies, analyzes a dataset of audit proposals
to investigate auditors’ impression management strategies, and, audit procurement quality
in the public sector. Text based analytic methods are employed to examine the content of
audit proposals, which were submitted for government audit engagements in fifteen
states.
The first study investigates auditors' marketing language and hypothesizes that
CPA firms will project a cooperative, non-independent image in audit proposals to
impress potential clients. The results suggest that CPA firms, especially larger ones,
project a persona of a cooperative and trustworthy service provider rather than presenting
themselves as independent auditors. In addition, CPA firms self-portray more
independence when client management is involved in a procurement process compared to
when an independent state audit agency selects the auditor. Responding to the PCAOB's
(2013) concern about auditors' commercial interests and marketing materials, the findings
suggest that CPA firms’ marketing language may threaten perceived auditor
independence and thus are important to security markets regulators, practitioners, and
decision makers.
The second study examines the association between auditor selection and
perceived audit service qualities in audit proposals. Based on agency theory and prior
research, this study predicts that government clients will choose an auditor whose audit
proposal reflects more perceived audit quality attributes and that this association will be
stronger for states with higher political competition or lower perceived risk of corruption.
The results indicate that government clients tend to select an auditor who emphasizes
competence, is a predecessor auditor, and, is less expensive. The findings provide
insights into governmental audit procurement practices and the determinants of auditor
selection decisions in the public sector.

The dissertation contributes to the literature by creating a new, unexplored dataset
of audit proposals, developing and validating linguistic categories related to the concepts
of auditor independence, relationship marketing, and competence, and exploring potential
threat of audit firms’ marketing materials to the appearance of auditor independence.
KEYWORDS: Impression Management, Auditor Independence,
Perceived Audit Quality Attributes, Audit Procurement,
Auditor Selection
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Chapter 1
1.

Introduction
This dissertation consists of two studies examining a dataset of audit proposals

submitted by auditing firms to obtain public sector engagements. The first study (Study 1)
investigates audit firms’ impression management strategies, explores the determinants of
firm images (i.e., personae), and discusses whether certain image attributes, even though
desired by audit clients, could impair auditor independence in appearance. The second
study (Study 2) addresses several perceived audit service qualities, examines audit
procurement quality by testing the association between those perceived quality attributes
retrieved from audit proposals and auditor selection decisions in a request-for-proposal
(RFP) process, and, inspects the effect of environmental factors on audit procurement
quality.
Investigating audit firms’ impression management in audit proposals has important
implications for standard setters and practitioners. Recently, the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB 2013) calls for attention to CPA firms’ marketing
materials and underlying marketing strategies, which could be at odds with audit quality
and independence. Like other professions, certified public accountant firms (CPA firms)
have interests in building close client relationships to maximize profit so their practice
remains economically viable. However, it potentially threatens the public’s confidence in
the value of audit if a firm’s commercial considerations conflict with auditors’
professionalism and further affect audit performance (e.g., Brown 2005). Therefore, it is
important to understand whether a firm’s marketing language promotes a close clientauditor relationship but, at the same time, endangers the appearance of auditor
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independence. The study results provide insights into how CPA firms use audit proposals
to market their services and how extensive marketing language could impair the
appearance of auditor independence. There are currently no constraints on auditors’
marketing materials; nevertheless, regulators and practitioners should be aware of and
attentive to the potential effects of audit firms’ marketing language, whether it is made
intentionally or unintentionally.
The Governmental Audit Quality Center (GAQC) of the American Institute of
CPAs (AICPA) recognizes and promotes the importance of quality governmental audits
and the value of such audits to government auditees. Examining the effectiveness of
governmental audit procurement practices has important implications to public officials
and the public. Each year, billions of dollars in federal grants are awarded to state and
local governments, and an increase in grants invokes a variety of grant management
challenges in government entities (Government Accountability Office 2012). As public
officials can benefit from a quality audit in many ways (e.g., improving performance and
accountability; enhancing citizens and stakeholders’ confidence), a well-designed audit
procurement practice that acts as a mechanism for ensuring audit quality (GAO 1986;
AICPA 1987) should be of interest to policy makers. Effective audit procurement
practices also benefit the public. In spite of laws and policies regulating public officials’
conduct, a number of government accounting scandals uncovered in the past decades
demonstrate the importance of government auditing and the role of external auditors as
gatekeepers of public resources. However, even though audit procurement is common in
the public sector, we know little about the practice itself or the determinants of the quality
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of audit procurement. In addition, understanding the audit procurement process in the
public sector may also hold insights and benefits for private audit procurement processes.
Both studies use a hand-collected dataset that consists of 378 audit proposals
submitted by 133 CPA firms to 123 government audit engagements. The analysis of
proposals employs a text analysis application called Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count
(LIWC). Study 1 investigates audit firms’ marketing language and persona reflected in
audit proposals. Impression management theory suggests that the firms will project
desirable images to their clients. The results are consistent with the prediction that CPA
firms, especially larger ones, project a persona of a cooperative and trustworthy service
provider, instead of an independent auditor, in their proposals. Study 2 examines the
association between auditor selection decision and perceived audit service qualities in
audit proposals. Agency theory suggests that agency problems (i.e., conflicts of interest
between public officials and taxpayers) will induce a need for a quality audit, and a high
political competition in a state could intensify this need (Baber 1983). The study
predictions are that government clients will choose an auditor whose audit proposal
reflects more perceived audit quality attributes, and that this association will be stronger
for states with higher political competition. I found that descriptions of auditor’s
competence in audit proposals predict auditor selection decisions in government audits.
Nevertheless, no evidence presented herein shows that auditor independence is associated
with auditor selection decision in a RFP process. In addition, audit clients, on average,
tend to hire a predecessor auditor (i.e., longer tenure). The overall results, however, do not
support the study hypotheses related to the effects of the environmental factors (i.e.,
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political competition and perceived risk of political corruption) on the quality of audit
procurement practices.
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 covers auditor
impression management and the determinants (Study 1) and includes a review of literature,
the pertinent theory, development of hypotheses, data selection, methodology, the results
and statistical analyses, and the discussion and conclusion. Chapter 3 relates auditor
selection decisions and perceived audit service qualities (Study 2) and provides a review
of literature on auditor selection, the pertinent theories, development of hypotheses, data
selection, methodology, the results and statistical analyses, and the discussion and
conclusion. Chapter 4 summaries the studies and concludes.

Copyright © Yu-Tzu Chang 2015
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Chapter 2
Study 1: Auditor Impression Management Strategies in Government Audit
Engagement
2.1.

Introduction
Study 1 discusses an overarching research problem: whether audit firm

impression management is at odds with auditor independence in appearance. Using
public audit data, I examine audit firms’ impression management and marketing
strategies through their language usage in audit proposals. Specifically, this study
investigates (1) the persona or image that CPA firms project in their proposals and (2)
whether these images differ by audit firm and procurement characteristic. It is important
to understand how audit firms market their services through impression management, as
firms’ commercial considerations reflected in assurance marketing materials may
influence audit quality and independence.
Auditor independence is a cornerstone of the auditing profession and a foundation
for audit quality (Caswell and Allen 2001). However, a series of financial scandals in the
early 2000s revealed evidence of a failure of the U.S. auditing system to deliver true
independence (Moore, Tetlock, Tanlu, and Bazerman 2006). Some researchers debate the
impossibility of true independence due to auditors’ unconscious biases. For example,
Bazerman, Morgan, and Loewenstein (1997) suggest that audit firms impair their
independence with clients due to unconscious biases (i.e., inherent self-serving biases) in
a contracting process. Moore et al. (2006) believe that unconscious bias is an important
source of violations of auditor independence and far more pervasive than intentional
corruption. Many other threats to auditor independence have been identified, including
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economic dependence, provisions of non-audit service, high competition, lengthy tenure,
and closeness of auditor-client relationships (e.g., CICA 2002; Swanger and Chewning
2001; SEC 2000). Identifying factors affecting the appearance of independence is
essential because financial statement users cannot accurately assess actual auditor
objectivity (McGrath, Siegel, Dunfee, Glazer, and Jaenicke 2001) but only its appearance.
That is, even if auditors are in fact independent, the lack of the appearance of
independence compromises overall independence.
This study examines auditor impression management as a potential threat to
auditor independence in appearance. Particularly, I investigate whether CPA firms create
and project a persona of a cooperative and customer-oriented service provider in audit
proposals, which may compromise auditor objectivity in appearance and thus threaten
perceived auditor independence. Based on the theories of relationship marketing and
impression management, this study, first, predicts that audit firms will highlight desirable
images in marketing materials to attract prospective clients. The second and third
hypotheses examine whether managerial involvement in auditor selection decisions and
audit firm characteristics affect auditors' impression management strategies.
The hand-collected sample consists of 378 audit proposals submitted by 133 CPA
firms in governmental RFP processes. The primary targeted data sources are the
government agencies who maintain a central depository for documents related to RFP's
for financial and/or single audit services. Text analytic methods are used to examine the
content of audit proposals. I identified several linguistic cues related to the attributes of
interest, created corresponding category word lists (i.e., dictionaries) based on a review of
five audit proposals, and utilized a text analysis application to analyze the data (i.e.,

6

capture the occurrences of the words in the developed dictionaries). The results indicate
that CPA firms, on average, project a persona of a cooperative and trustworthy service
provider, not an independent auditor, in their proposals. In addition, larger CPA firms
engage in more relationship marketing strategies in the bidding process than do smaller
firms. The findings imply that a CPA firm’s commercial interests partially drive its
impression management and that the personae created by firms may conflict with the
public’s and the regulators’ expectations of auditor independence (e.g., GAGAS 3.03;
AICPA Code 0.300.050; AU section 220).
This paper contributes to auditing research in several ways. First, this paper
identifies auditor impression management as a potential threat to the appearance of
auditor independence. This is an important issue to investors, practitioners, and regulators
as auditor independence is the foundation of the public’s trust in the attest function. The
study also responds to the PCAOB's (2013) call for attention to CPA firms' commercial
activities that may impair audit performance. The results suggest that CPA firms may
create an image with attributes desired by clients but not necessarily the public interest.
The findings provide insight into how the language in auditors’ assurance marketing
materials may endanger perceived auditor independence. Second, this study employs
emerging corpus linguistic and text analytic methods to analyze the audit proposals and
reveal the implicit promises made by auditors to their governmental clients. It is among
the first to create and validate word categories that capture these critical messages
communicated through audit proposals. Lastly, this study utilizes a new and unexplored
dataset to examine auditor relationship marketing strategies in a governmental RFP
process. The unique dataset of audit proposals facilitates our understanding of

7

governmental audit procurement practices and CPA firms' marketing communications.
The findings are important for practicing auditors, auditees, and the public interest
because auditors' impression management strategies may affect clients' auditor selection
results, perceived auditor independence, and audit quality.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 addresses the study background and
the supporting theories. Section 2.3 discusses the development of hypotheses, and Section
2.4 describes the method and the measurement of variables. Section 2.5 presents
descriptive statistics and analysis results. Section 2.6 concludes with a summary of the
first study.
2.2.

Background and Theory
Auditor-client relationships differ from typical buyer-seller relationships mainly

due to the nature of audit services. Specifically, although audit clients hire and pay
auditors, the intended users of audit services are existing and potential investors, lenders,
and other creditors. A potential conflict of interest between management and the financial
statement users raises a concern that auditors may also face a potential conflict of interest
when auditors are not independent of management (Bazerman et al. 1997). In fact,
numerous corporate accounting scandals (i.e., Enron, WorldCom) have called attention to
the issue of impairment of auditor independence. As a result, regulatory reforms have
increasingly focused on promoting auditor independence. For example, a primary goal of
the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) is to enhance external auditor independence.
However, some studies suggest that the auditing reforms of SOX may not work as
expected in practice instead (e.g., Ashbaugh, LaFond, and Mayhew 2003; Fiolleau,
Hoang, Jamal, and Sunder 2013).
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The increasingly complex business environment intensifies the competition
among audit firms, which may further erode auditor independence. Responding to
increasing competition in the audit market, more firms have adopted a marketing
orientation (e.g., Ahmed and Hopson 1990), which emphasizes the importance of
meeting clients' needs and developing a long-term relationship with clients, potentially
over auditor independence. The Big 4 firms, as the leaders in audit markets, recognize the
value of relationship marketing. For instance, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) website
asserts a commitment to help their clients to address both present and future business
challenges in the US market 1. The firm claims to deliver audit value by meeting clients'
business needs and develop its reputation by building lasting relationships with their
clients. Similarly, Deloitte declares that it will provide timely communications regarding
professional developments and insights for their clients' business 2, in addition to core
audit services (i.e., audit financial statements and report on internal controls). The other
two Big 4 firms, KPMG and Ernst &Young, use a similar marketing approach.
The accounting literature recognizes the importance of the application of
relationship marketing concepts in the context of auditing. For instance, Ruyter and
Wetzels (1999) examine affective commitment in auditor-client relationships and suggest
that perceived service quality, trust, and interdependence motivate clients to continue
their relationships with an audit firm. A more recent study suggests that audit clients
prefer a cooperative, trusting, and long-term relationship with their auditors, in which
they can seek advice and feedback from the auditors beyond core audit services (i.e.,
1

PwC. 2015. “Financial Statement Audit.” Accessed March 30. http://www.pwc.com/en_GX/gx/auditservices/financial-statement-audit/index.jhtml.
2
Deloitte. 2015. “Financial Statement & Internal Control Audit Services. Delivering Specialized Audit
Services.” Accessed March 30. http://www.deloitte.com/view/en_US/us/Services/audit-enterprise-riskservices/Financial-Statement-Internal-Control-Audit/index.htm.
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value-added auditing) (Fontaine and Pilote 2012). However, an intimate auditor-client
relationship may threaten auditor independence (e.g., Windsor and Ashkanasy 1995;
Bamber and Iyer 2007). In fact, the Independence Standards Board (ISB 2000) identified
auditors' familiarity with the client as one of five threats to auditor independence.
Related issue concerns auditors' commercial attitudes and interests. Some scholars
are concerned that growing commercialism encourages accounting firms to develop an
organizational culture that emphasizes profit and commercial gain over professional
independence and objectivity (Wyatt 2004; Zeff 2003). The PCAOB (2013) also argues
that auditors' commercial interests and marketing strategies may influence audit quality
and independence. In summary, the increasingly intimate auditor-client relationship (e.g.,
Toffler and Reingold 2003) and auditors' commercialism (e.g., Suddaby, Gendron, and
Lam 2009; Carrington, Johed, and Öhman 2011) may affect accounting professionalism
and professional values and thereby erode audit firm independence.
2.2.1. Impression Management Theory
Goffman (1959) introduces the theory of impression management, which
describes a person's performance as the presentation of self and proposes that people
adjust their behaviors to project a certain image or impression to others. In sociology and
social psychology, impression management is a goal-oriented, conscious or unconscious,
process in which “people present a favorable public image of oneself so that others will
form positive judgment” (Newman 2009 p. 184). The notion of impression management
also applies to an organization's practices in professional communication and public
relations. Organizational managers recognize that a congruency between organizational
actions and the interests of the public are critical to organizational survival (e.g., Meyer
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and Rowan 1977). By regulating and controlling information in social interaction
(Piwinger and Ebert 2001), corporations establish and maintain desirable public
perception, e.g., “branding” initiatives.
In accounting, voluntary disclosure research applies the theory of impression
management to explain why organizations disclose selective financial information.
Studies suggest that management can signal organizational actions through textual
content (i.e., disclosures in annual reports, chief executive officers' statements,
sustainability reports) and graphical disclosure (i.e., key financial variable graphs in
annual reports) to manage public impressions (i.e., environmental and social
responsibility, good performance) (Aerts 2005; Cho, Michelon, and Patten 2012; Dilla
and Janvrin 2010; Neu, Warsame, and Pedwell 1998; Warsame, Neu, and Simmons,
2002). In auditing, the theory of impression management is used to predict that the
auditing profession has an interest in creating and maintaining a public image that
emphasizes auditors’ trustworthiness. For example, Neu's (1991) case study of Canadian
audit firms investigates the profession's impression management activities 3. In a recent
study, Gold, Gronewold, and Salterio (2014) propose that an auditor's own impression
management concerns can affect audit performance. Specifically, the study examines the
effect of error management climate (i.e., the treatment of audit staff by superiors) on
auditors’ error-reporting decision and finds that auditors are less willing to their report
conceptual than mechanical errors. One explanation for this result is that auditors believe
that reporting their own conceptual errors is more problematic for their image than is
reporting mechanical errors. The relative unwillingness to report conceptual errors can be
3

His findings suggest four sets of institutional practices that help to create and maintain the impression of
the trustworthy auditor: (1) professional entrance requirement, (2) maintenance of a professional
technology, (3) good works activities, and (4) disciplinary activities.
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an issue to audit quality, given that conceptual errors may be more consequential than are
mechanical errors.
Impression management suggests that auditors will project desirable public
images to potential clients in their marketing materials. The next section discusses several
desirable public images (i.e., perceived audit service quality attributes) that auditors are
likely to highlight in their proposals with an intention to affect potential clients’
perceptions.
2.2.2. Desirable Audit Service Attributes
Independence
Auditor independence is widely recognized as the cornerstone of the auditing
profession as it is the foundation for the public’s trust in the attest function (Caswell and
Allen 2001). In fact, perceived auditor independence is positively associated with
investor perceptions of financial reporting credibility (Khurana and Raman 2006).
Researchers also view independence as a critical attribute of audit quality. For example,
DeAngelo (1981) believes that audit quality is a product of auditors' ability to discover
(i.e., competence) and report (i.e., independence) a breach in the clients' accounting
system. In short, without independence auditing and attest practices lack value (Wallace
2004). Regulators and legislators also emphasize the importance of auditor independence.
For example, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) indicates
that independence is a distinguishing feature of the audit profession and requires auditors
who provide auditing and other attestation services be independent both in fact and in
appearance (Code 0.300.050). In the capital market sector, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) believes that the independence requirement is vital to the securities
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markets and serves two public policy goals ― fostering high quality audits and
promoting investor confidence in the integrity of public financial information (SEC 2000).
In the public sector, general accepted government auditing standards (GAGAS)
emphasize the importance of independence and require that the audit organization and its
individual auditors must be independent in all matters relating to the government or
public audit work (GAO 2011). In addition, while performing audit and attest services,
“auditors should avoid situations that could lead reasonable and informed third parties to
conclude that the auditors are not independent and thus are not capable of exercising
objective and impartial judgment” (GAGAS Section 3.04, 28). The guidance suggests
that auditors should establish and maintain an independent image (i.e., independence in
appearance) at all time.
Relationship Marketing Images (Personae)
The relationship marketing literature explores clients’ preferences for two
relationship approaches – transactional or relational approach (e.g., Gronroos 1991, 1997;
Gummesson 2002). The transactional approach is based on a premise that competition
and self-interest results in an arm’s length relationship (Morgan and Hunt 1994). In
contrast, the relational approach is based on a perspective that interdependence and
cooperation results in a trusting relationship. In survey results, Fontaine and Pilote (2012)
found that financial executives prefer more of a relational than a transactional approach
with their external auditors. Their findings suggest that audit clients prefer a cooperative,
trusting, and long-term relationship with their auditors. As trust is a fundamental
cornerstone in a cooperative working relationship (e.g., Morgan and Hunt 1994), audit
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firms taking a relational approach are likely to project relationship marketing images–
cooperation and trustworthy–in their audit proposals.
In addition, client satisfaction is positively associated with auditor-client
relationships (e.g., Behn, Carcello, Hermanson, and Hermanson 1997). The current study
examines four determinants of audit client satisfaction: responsiveness, empathy, value,
and effectiveness. Responsiveness refers to an auditor's ability to react to client needs
(Butcher, Harrison, and Ross 2013; Iskandar, Rahmat, and Ismail 2010; Duff 2004, 2009;
Behn et al. 1997; Carcello, Hermanson, and McGrath 1992); for example, the audit firm
is flexible in tailoring audit services to meet clients' needs. Studies in audit client
satisfaction support the assertion that client-focused attention (i.e., responsiveness to
client needs) is an important attribute contributing to client satisfaction (e.g., Behn et al.
1997, 1999; Iskandar et al. 2010; Butcher et al. 2013). Empathy refers to the degree of
auditors' understanding of clients’ desires, goals, and business challenges (Duff 2004,
2009). For instance, the auditor shows concern about the client's business and is proactive
in providing constructive accounting-related suggestions. Marketing research suggests
that empathy is a critical component to fostering a close relationship between two parties
(e.g., Berry, Zeithaml, and Parasuraman 1990; Sin et al. 2005). Value refers to auditors'
ability to provide value-added audit services, from which clients can benefit beyond the
statutory audit (e.g., Beattie and Fearnley 1998; Eilifsen, Knechel, and Wallage 2001;
Fontaine and Pilote 2012; Herda and Lavelle 2013). That is, clients expect auditors to be
a source of support for their business decision-making activity by providing guidance on
accounting principles, feedback on internal controls, and general business advice. In fact,
responding to clients' needs, audit firms' marketing initiatives have actively promoted the

14

value-added audit services (Beattie, Fearnley, and Brandt 2000). Lastly, effectiveness is
included as a service quality attribute because audit delay in the US local government
sector has been recognized as problematic to audit clients (Johnson, Davis, and Freeman
2002; Payne and Jensen 2002). Effectiveness refers to the auditors' ability and
commitment to perform the audit in a timely manner. For example, the auditor completes
the audit by the contracted deadline.
Table 2.1 summarizes the desirable attributes discussed above and provides the
corresponding definitions and sources.
< Insert Table 2.1 here >
2.3.

Development of Hypotheses
Impression management is important to a corporation, or CPA firm, especially

when the corporation’s external stakeholders cannot directly observe some of its
organizational activities but rely on public information as an imperfect proxy for these
activities (e.g., corporate culture, moral conduct). That is, organizations can manage their
public impressions by selectively providing information to stakeholders through different
types of communication (e.g., media, annual reports, Tweets). In the audit market, audit
clients cannot perfectly observe or evaluate the audit services they purchase due to the
nature of auditing. Therefore, CPA firms may construct their audit proposals as a type of
marketing material to appeal to potential clients.
Impression management theory predicts that audit firms will enhance desirable
aspects of the firm or obfuscate undesirable aspects (Gioia, Schultz, and Corley 2000) in
their audit proposals in order to shape potential audit clients' perceptions in favor of the
firm. In contrast, audit professionalism encourages auditors to serve a higher social
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function and embrace the values of objectivity and independence (Suddaby et al. 2009).
However, auditors’ commercial interests may drive them to focus on building
relationships with clients (e.g., Wyatt 2004; Gendron, Suddaby, and Lam 2006).
Therefore, CPA firms may deliver “blended” messages in audit proposals, which reflect
both their professional and commercial values. For the following reasons, this study
predicts that auditors’ commercial considerations will influence their proposal language
more than do their professional values. First, the purpose of audit proposals is to attract
potential audit clients. Thus, it is likely that audit firms will include desirable attributes in
proposals that increase their attractiveness of potential clients. Second, auditors have
financial incentives (i.e., maximizing profit) to meet clients' expectations or desirability
(e.g., Zeff 2003). Responding to clients’ relationship preferences, audit firms are likely to
take a relational approach and to build a cooperative, trusting, and long-term relationship
with their potential clients. Hence, the first hypothesis:
H1: Audit firms are more likely to project a persona reflecting relationship marketing
images than a persona of an independent auditor in their audit proposals.
To further understand what drives auditor impression management, the next
sections propose two factors, characteristics of the procurement practice and audit firm
size, which can affect auditor image management strategies and language usage in audit
proposals.
2.3.1. Management Influence over Auditor Selection in Government Audits
The U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB), which oversees the
administration of the federal budget and the effectiveness of agency programs, requires
funded entities expending $500,000 or more in federal awards to comply with the audit
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and internal control requirements of Circular A-133 (OMB 2003). These non-federal
entities must be audited by a public accountant or a Federal, State or Local government
audit organization, which meets the general standards specified in generally accepted
government auditing standards (GAGAS). Although the audit and internal control
requirements of Circular A-133 are uniform across the U.S. states, considerable diversity
exists in audit procurement policies, regulations, and procedures across states. For
example, a survey conducted by the National Association of State Auditors, Comptrollers
and Treasurers (NASACT 2012) reports that the state audit agency serves as the primary
auditor of the basic financial statements in 34 states and the single audits in 13 states.
CPA firms conduct 100 percent of the basic financial statement audits in 11 states and the
single audits in 10 states. In most cases, the single audits are conducted jointly by state
auditors and CPA firms. In addition, in the states where audits are conducted by external
auditors, state audit agencies and/or audited entities contract with CPA firms for audits.
That is, in some states, state audit agencies are fully responsible for initiating a RFP
process and selecting external auditors for hiring governmental entities; however, in other
states, state audit agencies and management from audited entities jointly select auditors 4.
From reading RFPs documents and talking with personnel from the state auditor
offices, I assume that the role of a state audit agency is similar to that of audit committees
4

For example, per discussion with Mr. Giesler, Chief Operating Office at the office of the Auditor of
Public Accounts (APA) in Kentucky, the Auditor’s office is responsible for initiating a RFP for audit
services and evaluating the audit proposals received. The evaluation committee members from the APA
office review the technical proposal and award points accordingly. The State Auditor then ranks the
proposed firms based on their scores and begins with the top firm to negotiate for audit fees. If negotiation
fails, the APA then contacts the firm with the second highest score. However, the review process is
different in other states. In Ohio, for instance, the Auditor of State works with audited entities to select
external auditors. Specifically, client management from the audited entities can use any methodology that
deems to be appropriate to evaluate firms’ audit proposals and have the option to award "Client Preference
Points" to bidding firms. Members of an evaluation committee from the Auditor of State also review and
grade firms’ proposals. The selection of the auditor is based on the combined scores from the committee
and the client management.
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in the profit sector for two reasons. First, state audit agencies are independent of the
hiring governmental entities (i.e., audit clients) and thus should exercise their
independent judgment diligently. Second, the individuals involved in a RFP evaluation
process are usually the audit professionals in the state audit agencies. In most cases, these
individuals are experts with experiences in preparing, auditing, analyzing and evaluating
financial statements. In short, like audit committees in the private sector, state audit
agencies should act as a mechanism for improving auditor independence in the public
sector. However, there is little evidence supporting the claim that audit committees
eliminate threats to auditor independence.
Little auditing research discusses how client management influences auditor
selection decisions in the public sector. Wilson and Stewart (1990) found that the quality
of municipal financial reporting is positively associated with the level of underwriter
competition in the primary market for new issues of general obligation bonds. Their
findings suggest that government clients have incentives to employ an independent CPA
firm auditor to signal the credibility of their financial information, which in turn increases
competition for bond issues and reduces borrowing costs (e.g., West 1967; Kessel 1971).
On the other hand, auditing research related to private sector clients often suggests that
management influence over auditor appointments negatively affect auditor independence
(e.g., Carcello and Neal 2000, 2003). However, there is no substantial evidence indicating
how CPA firms would present themselves (i.e., less or more independent) when client
management is involved in a RFP process.
Fiolleau et al. (2013) suggest that auditors in a RFP process strategically present
information that responds to the decision makers' needs and preferences. As a state audit
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agency and client management are likely to play a different role in a government audit
and thus may have different preferences, I predict that, in response to the variations in
each state's evaluation procedures, CPA firms will strategically create different personae
in their proposals. I state my second hypothesis non-directionally as follows:
H2: Audit firms will strategically project different personae in their audit proposals
based on the composition of the evaluators in the hiring process.
2.3.2. Audit Firm Size
Client importance to audit firms is a potential threat to auditor independence
(Tepalagul and Lin 2015). When an audit firm economically depends on a client, the
threat of losing the client would mitigate the auditor’s responsiveness to penalties for
compromising independence (Falk, Lynn, Mestelman, and Shehata 1999). In other words,
when receiving compensation that constitutes a significant part of service revenues to the
auditor, the auditor is financially bonded to the client and thus has an incentive to
maintain a good client relationship. To warrant future profits, the auditor may
compromise independence and act in favor of the client to the detriment of the public
interest (Blay 2005). Hence, client importance (i.e., as a percentage of total revenues)
may be negatively associated with auditor independence.
However, audit firm size and reputation may moderate the impact of client
importance. While holding the client size constant, the proportion of future profits
generated from a client is less significant to a larger firm than to a smaller one. As
DeAngelo (1981) suggests, perceived auditor independence is positively related to audit
firm size as larger audit firms have a lower percentage of total audit fees dependent on
any one client. In addition, auditor reputation is an important intangible asset that is
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developed and maintained through effortful management of a firm's public image. Many
studies assume larger auditors have more valuable reputations (e.g., DeAngelo 1981;
Barton 2005) and support that auditor independence is positively associated with auditor
reputation. They argue that building a brand name and reputation is costly and that
auditors with established reputations have more to lose from misrepresentation.
Consequently, reputable auditors have a stronger incentive to self-represent as objective,
independent auditors. The arguments above suggest that large, reputable audit firms have
stronger incentives to maintain their professional, independent image than do small firms.
On the other hand, competition in the audit market have forced audit firms to
consider marketing and branding strategies (e.g., Reid 2008; Jaworski, Kohli, and Sahay
2000). Studies find that market activities are increasing in the audit industry (e.g., Clow,
Stevens, McConkey, and Loundon 2009; Hodges and Young 2009; Broberg, Umans, and
Gerlofstig 2013). One explanation is that professional service firms include marketing in
their business activities in order to gain a competitive advantage (Hodges and Young
2009). As relationship marketing can be costly (e.g., Cao and Gruca 2005) and large audit
firms have more resources than do small firms, I speculate that large audit firms,
compared to small audit firms, are more likely to engage in relationship marketing in a
bidding process. That is, they are more likely to project a persona of a cooperative and
trustworthy service provider in their audit proposals. Based on the arguments above, it is
unclear how audit firm size would affect auditor impression management. Therefore, the
third hypothesis is non-directional.
H3: Audit firm size will affect auditor impression management in audit proposals.
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The next section discusses the sample and data collection, the study method, and
the measurement of variables used to test the hypotheses.
2.4.

Data and Method

2.4.1. Sample and Data Collection
The sample is constructed using a set of audit proposals submitted by CPA firms
in a governmental RFP process. A typical audit proposal consists of transmittal letter,
firm background and qualifications, staff information and experience, and audit plan. The
primary targeted data sources are the government agencies who maintain a central
depository for documents related to RFP's for financial and/or single audit services. I
obtained a complete list of those agencies from the National Association of State
Auditors, Comptrollers and Treasurers (NASACT). The NASACT is an organization
consisting of 56 audit agencies 5 that are comprised of state officials who have been
elected or appointed to the Office of State Auditor, State Comptroller, or State Treasurer
to deal with the financial management of state government in the 50 states, the District of
Columbia, and U.S. territories. Requests to the 50 audit agencies for the public records
related to audit RFPs were made via email, websites, and phone calls. In response to the
open record requests, the audit agencies of 20 states 6 provided documents related to
2008-2013 audits contracted to CPA firms, including RFP's, audit proposals, and

5

Three states have more than one audit agency, i.e., Minnesota, New Jersey, and South Carolina.
Twenty states include CO, FL, HA, IL, IN, KS, KY, MI, MO, NC, ND, NH, NJ, NY, OH, OK, TX, VA,
VT, and WY. The remaining states either do not maintain a central depository for the documents requested
or do not contract out governmental audits to CPA firms.

6
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contracts. The current sample 7 includes 133 CPA firms, who submitted 378 audit
proposals, on 123 engagements from 15 U.S. states 8.
2.4.2. Linguistic Methods
Accounting and finance research increasingly employs linguistic methods in
analyzing accounting- or finance-related textual documents. For instance, a stream of
research analyzes linguistic cues to study in corporate annual reports and financial
disclosures (Li 2006; Loughran and McDonald 2014), earnings press releases (Demers
and Vega 2011), firm-specific financial news stories (Tetlock, Saar-Tsechansky, and
MacSkassy 2008), transcripts of quarterly earnings conference call (Larcker and
Zakolyukina 2012), and online client reviews of tax preparers (Witherspoon and Stone
2014). These studies differ in terms of the selection of the linguistic features and the
techniques used to extract those cues. This paper uses a text analysis application,
Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count, or LIWC 9, to content analyze audit proposals (i.e.,
capture the occurrences of the words related to the image attributes of interest). The next
section addresses the development of word categories in this study.
2.4.2.1.

Dictionary Development
This study utilizes LIWC to capture and count the occurrences of the words

related to the constructs of interest (i.e., the image attributes in audit proposals). Although
LIWC has well-developed word lists (e.g., positive and negative emotions words,
7

Based on a G*Power omnibus multiple regression power analysis, a priori statistical power of the studies
are adequate (>90%), given medium effect size and the number of the predictors in each study at an alpha
value of 0.05 (i.e., Type I error rate).
8
Data from five states (i.e., FL, HA, MO, NY, and TX) is omitted due to incomplete data.
9
LIWC is an application for studying carious emotional, cognitive, and structural components present in
individuals' verbal and written speech samples. The LIWC application relies on an internal default
psychosocial dictionary that defines which words should be counted in the target text files (Pennebaker et
al., 2007). There are three versions of this application: LIWC, LIWC2001, and LIWC2007. This study uses
LIWC2007, the most recent evolution as of the date of the study. Hereafter in this paper, I refer LIWC2007
to as LIWC.
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cognitive words, pronouns, certainty and tentative words, etc.), its internal default
dictionary does not capture or measure the constructs in the current study. Therefore, for
each linguistic attribute listed in Table 2.1, I created a list of words (i.e., dictionary)
within LIWC by adapting the method of Larcker and Zakolyukina (2012), Li (2006),
Loughran, McDonald, and Yun (2009), and Witherspoon and Stone (2013) to the present
data set. Specifically, I randomly sampled five proposals from different CPA firms to
generate sets of words for each image attribute identified in the previous section. Next, I
developed category word lists for references to these attributes by adding synonyms 10 to
the corresponding categories. Following Pennebaker et al.'s (2007) procedures, external
judges validated the dictionaries. Accounting professionals were recruited as independent
judges to review the preliminary category word lists. They completed a survey instrument
including two tasks, which asks them to make decisions about an inclusion or exclusion
of a word in each dictionary word list 11. Table 2.2 lists the attributes (word categories),
words included in each category, and reliability statistics for each category. To validate
the reliability of the constructed word categories, I calculated the correlations between
the occurrences of each word in a category with the sum of the other words in the same
category (Pennebaker et al. 2007). Explanations for the reported low reliability statistics
are that (1) the uncorrected method used to calculate raw alpha tends to underestimate
reliability and (2) in terms of the nature of discourse, once people say something, they
usually do not repeat it in the same paragraph or essay but move to the next topic
(Pennebaker et al. 2007). Hence, this is unlike validity tests of standardized,
psychological instruments.

10
11

Thesaurus. 2014. Accessed September 2. http://www.thesaurus.com
See Appendix A for a detailed description of the survey instrument and the task procedures.
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< Insert Table 2.2 here >
2.4.2.2.

Procedures
The audit proposals received are in different forms including hard copies,

readable PDF, and image-only PDF. In order to run content analysis, several assistants
and I performed the following tasks. First, I converted each proposal to a text file. Second,
an assistant followed instructions to remove irrelevant text and standard languages copied
from the RFP's, such as standard contract provisions and contract certifications. Third,
the assistants reviewed the remaining texts to remove misspellings and manually fixed
errors that occurred in the converting process (i.e., unrecognizable words). Lastly, after
reviewing the assistants’ work, I imported the files to LIWC and processed the texts with
the developed dictionary (see Table 2.2) to calculate the percentage of the words related
to the attributes. Similar to related studies (e.g., Li 2006; Larcker and Zakolyukina 2012),
this study ignores context and considers the position of a word in a sentence irrelevant for
classification (i.e., a bag-of-words approach). The next section specifies the models and
the definitions of the variables.
2.4.3. Mixed-Effect Models
This study employs a mixed effect model to examine whether management
influence over auditor selection and audit firm size affect personae that CPA firms
project in audit proposals. The mixed effect model is appropriate to fit the data in the
current study because the audit proposal dataset has a hierarchical design structure (i.e.,
nested data) in which audit proposals are nested within engagements that are nested
within states. Due to the nested data structure, I assumed a relationship among
engagements such that an audit procurement process of a state is similar to others in the
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same state. Likewise, because a CPA firm can submit a proposal to more than one
engagement in one or different states, I assumed co-dependence between the audit
proposals and submitting firms. That is, audit proposals submitted by a CPA firm (i.e.,
within firm) should share more attributes than those submitted by other CPA firms (i.e.,
between firms). Those relationships among the observations are referred to as random
effects. I employed a mixed effect model to estimate the parameters as it is appropriate
for nested designs (Fidell and Tabachnick 2007; Schielzeth and Nakagawa 2013) and can
account for both fixed and random effects 12 in the current study model. The dependent
variables are predicted by the fixed effects specified in the model as well as the random
(nested) effects of Engagement within State, State, and CPA firm. Specifically, I
regressed four dependent variables separately on several fixed-effect variables including
indicators for management influence (MgtInf) and for Top 100 CPA firm (Top100) and
the natural logarithm of proposed audit fee (Fees), proposal word count (WC), and
engagement size (EngSize); as well as on random-effect variables including the nested
effect of engagement within State (EngRC(StateRC)), State (StateRC), and CPA firm
(FirmRC).
The dependent variables (DVs), IMAGE, refer to four CPA firms’ image
attributes including Independence (INDP), Cooperation (COP), Trustworthy (Trust), and
Client Satisfaction (CS). The DVs are four linguistic variables: INDP refers to auditors’
integrity and objectivity; COP indicates auditors’ willingness to cooperatively work with
clients; Trust measures auditors’ reliability; and CS includes four service qualities

12

Gelman (2005, p. 21) defines effects as fixed in a multilevel model “if they are identical for all groups in
a population” and as random “if they are allowed to differ from group to group”. In other words, fixed
effects assume that observations are independent while random effects assume dependent relations among
observations.
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(responsiveness, empathy, value, and effectiveness). Table 2.1. provides the detailed
definitions of the DVs. I operationalized the DVs by adopting Pennebaker et al.’s (2007)
approach to calculate the percentage of the words related to these image attributes. The
first independent variable (IV) of interest, MgtInf, is an indicator of whether client
management has an influence on the auditor choice in a governmental RFP process. The
second IV of interest, Top100, measuring audit firm size, indicates whether an audit firm
is listed as a Top100 CPA firm by Accounting Today. Three variables are included as
control variables in the model 13. As engagement size and audit fees can directly affect
auditors’ commercial interests in bidding a job, I controlled for the size of engagement
(EngSize) and proposed audit fees (Fee), which were measured as the audittee’s operating
expenditures in a prior year and estimated service fees proposed in the audit proposals,
respectively. In addition, I included the word count (WC) of audit proposals as a control
variable because the length of proposals correlates with the linguistic-based DVs. As for
the random-effect variables, I used the EngRC, StateRC, and FirmRC variables instead of
the original string variables in the data set. Those ‘RC’ variables contain the same
information as the original ones; they were simply recoded as nominal scaled variables so
that the output will be easier to be interpreted. The model is as follows.
IMAGEijk = β0 + β1*MgtInfi + β2*Top100k +β3*Feeijk + β4*EngSizeij +β5*WCijk +
random effects + ε
where for state i, engagement j, and firm k:
IMAGE = A vector of four variables, which are simple counts of the words
related to Independence, Cooperation, Trustworthy, and Client
Satisfaction divided by the number of words in the proposal ignoring
articles (wc);
13

Because the control variables are not normally distributed, the variables are transformed by taking
logarithms of the raw values before entering into the models.
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MgtInf = 1 if client management helps to select the auditor, and 0 otherwise;
Top100 = 1 if the audit firm is listed as a Top100 CPA firm by Accounting
Today, and 0 otherwise;
Fee = Natural logarithm of proposed audit fee;
EngSize = Natural logarithm of audittee’s operating expense/expenditures; and
WC = Natural logarithm of word count in a text file of an audit proposal.
2.5.

Results
Descriptive statistics and correlations among the variables are presented below,

followed by the main results of hypothesis testing.
2.5.1. Descriptive Statistics
The sample includes 378 audit proposals from 133 CPA firms, which were
submitted to 123 engagements. Table 2.3 demonstrates the composition of the sample by
states. The majority of the engagements (i.e., 80% of the 123 engagements) in the sample
are from five states 14 including Colorado (19), Illinois (19), Kentucky (40), North
Carolina (9), and Ohio (12). The majority of the audit proposals (i.e., 87% of the 378
audit proposals) are from seven states (Colorado, Illinois, Kentucky, North Carolina,
Ohio, Oklahoma, and Virginia). On average, each engagement received three audit
proposals. The proposals in the sample are from 133 CPA firms, of which 32 firms are
listed as Top100 CPA firms by Accounting Today during the period from 2009 to 2012.
About 183 (48%) of the proposals were submitted by Top100 CPA firms; of which 24
(13%) were from the Big 4 accounting firms.
< Insert Table 2.3 here >

14

A MANOVA indicates that these five states do not differ from the 45 states in terms of the population
(F=.729, p=.397), Ranny’s political competition Index (F=.355, p=.554), tax revenue (F=.305, p=.583),
state revenue per capital (F=.949, p=.335), long-term public debt (F=.013, p=.911), number of state and
local employees (F=1.110, p=.297), general expenditure (F=.288, p=.594), spending from state and federal
funds as a percent of state personal income (F=1.019, p=.318), and state economic freedom scores (F=.143,
p=.707) during the sampled years.
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Table 2.4 reconciles the samples that were used in the primary analyses. Eight
proposals were removed from the analyses because they were submitted for a nonfinancial statement audit engagement. The remaining 370 proposals are related either
basic financial statement audits or single audits. In Kentucky, CPA firms are allowed to
submit one proposal for multiple engagements. For the 2010 and 2012 audit procurement,
the Kentucky Auditors of Public Accounts (APA) contracted for 39 audit engagements.
Twenty-five CPA firms responded to the RFPs, and the Kentucky APA received a total
of 38 audit proposals because some CPA firms submitted proposals to both RFPs. Within
each RFP, each engagement received an average of eight proposals that were also
submitted to at least one of other engagements. I removed those 38 KY proposals from
the main analysis because most of these proposals were submitted to more than one
engagement (range from two to 20 engagements). This multiple-counting of proposals
would add noise in the analyses. Lastly, forty-four of the remaining 332 (370-38)
proposals do not have the information of proposed audit fees. That results in 288
proposals (332-44) with complete data. The main analyses in the following section used
both samples (i.e., n=288 and n=332) to test the hypotheses.
Table 2.5, Panel A reports descriptive statistics on the linguistic-based variables
retrieved from the audit proposals (n=332) and the control variables. The linguistic-based
variables, Independence (INDP), Cooperation (COP), Trustworthy (Trust), and Client
Satisfaction (CS), are measured based on word percentages, which were calculated by
LIWC as a percentage of matched words against the number of all words ignoring articles
in a given text file (Pennebaker et al. 2007). Among these variables, the mean values
suggest that CPA firms more frequently use words related to client satisfaction, followed
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by cooperation, trustworthy, and independence, in their audit proposals. Affective
processes (affect), positive emotion (posemo), and negative emotion (negemo) are
measured based on the default LIWC word dictionaries. The values of posemo are higher
than those of negemo, which indicates that CPA firms express more positive emotion
than negative emotion in their audit proposals. WC (word count) measures the total
number of words in a given file. The average word count in the sample is 6,679 words.
The average proposed audit fee is $395,955. The range of the proposed fees (Fees) is
wide: the lowest proposed fee is about $12,000 and the highest is about $6.4 million,
which suggests high variability in the size and/or the complexity of the engagements in
the sample. The percentile measure further indicates that the majority of proposed audit
fees are relatively small (i.e., 75% of the sample is below $260,000). In fact, only 24
proposed engagement fees are above $1 million. The normality tests (skewness and
kurtosis) indicate that several variables are not normally distributed. For example, the
distribution of the variable Fees is highly skewed (Skewness = 3.91) with heavy tails
(Kurtosis = 16.31). In addition, histograms of the variables indicate outliers at the right
end of the distributions. Therefore, before modeling, these variables are transformed by
winsorizing at the 95% percentile or by taking natural logarithms. Panel B reports the
transformed data. The skewness and kurtosis values indicate that the variables are
normally distributed after transformation, which are then used in the subsequent analyses.
The following panels report with the transformed numbers when they are meaningful in
interpretation.
< Insert Table 2.5 here >
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Panels C and D present the composition of the sample by type of CPA firm,
Top100 (n=183) or non-Top100 (n=149), respectively. The average proposed audit fee is
higher in the Top100 CPA sample than that in the non-Top100 CPA sample. It suggests
that either Top100 CPA firms charge premium fees or they have more capacity to bid on
larger engagements. Except for the variables INDP and negemo, the mean values of all
other variables for Top100 CPA firms are higher than those for non-Top100 CPA firms 15.
Again, the mean value of INDP is smaller than that of any other linguistic-based variable
in both samples. Panels E and F represent the composition of the sample by an indicator
of management involvement in an auditor selection process (i.e., Yes or No). The average
proposed audit fee is higher in the management involvement subsample than that in the
non-management involvement subsample. With respect to the linguistic variables, the
management involvement sample has a higher mean value in INDP but lower in COP,
Trust, and CS as compared to the non-management sample. In addition, the engagements
in the management involvement sample are averagely smaller than those in the nonmanagement sample.
Table 2.6 reports correlations of the transformed and binary variables. MgtInf is
significantly positively correlated with INDP and Fees but negatively correlated with
Top100, COP, Trust, CS, and EngSize. These results suggest that there are more small
CPA firms bidding for governmental audit jobs in the states where client management is
involved in the audit procurement process, compared to the states where independent
audit agencies select auditors. A possible explanation is that the audit engagements
contracted out in the states where client management help to select auditors are

15

An untabulated T-test analysis also shows that the mean values of COP, Trust, CS, and Fees differ
between the larger and smaller CPA firm subsamples (p<.001).
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significantly smaller than those in the states where client management is not involved in
the RFP process (t=2.62; p<0.01). Top100 CPA firms may be less interested in small
engagements, perhaps because they generate little profit. In addition, when management
is involved in selecting auditors, CPA firms are more likely to present themselves as
independent auditors and less likely to employ relationship marketing approaches in their
audit proposals. The variable Top100 positively correlates with COP, Trust, CS, Fees,
and EngSize. An explanation of the positive correlations among Top100, Fees, and
EngSize is that large CPA firms are more likely to bid on large engagements and thus
propose higher audit fees than do smaller firms. Consistent with the results of a metaanalysis of audit fee determinants (Hay 2013), the positive correlation between Fees and
EngSize is indicates that auditors charge more fees for larger, complex engagements.
Collinearity diagnostics indicate that there is no multicollinearity among the IVs of
Top100, MgtInf, Fees, EngSize, and WC (i.e., VIF<2.5 in all tests). Among the linguistic
variables, the correlations of the three RM measures are significant (p < 0.01).
Interestingly, INDP is positively correlated with Trust and CS, but not with COP.
< Insert Table 2.6 here >
2.5.2. Tests of Hypotheses
H1 predicts that audit firms will more frequently use words related to relationship
marketing images (i.e., cooperation, trustworthy, client satisfaction) than those related to
independence in their proposals. I ran a paired sample t-test to examine whether there is a
significant difference between the average values of those image attributes. Specifically, I
compared the mean of INDP to that of COP, Trust, and CS, respectively. Table 2.7 Panel
A (n=332) reports the results of the paired samples tests, which indicate that the mean
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value of INDP is significantly different (i.e., smaller) than that of COP (t=-18.99), Trust
(t=-15.57), and CS (t=-43.72) 16. In addition, an untabulated one-way ANOVA contrast
test (planned comparisons) shows that the mean value of INDP is significantly different
from that of COP, Trust, and CS (t=45.08; p<0.01). The result holds for the sample with
the 288 observations as reported in Panel B. Therefore, H1 is supported.
< Insert Table 2.7 here >
H2 predicts that audit firms will strategically project different personae in their
audit proposals in response to a different composition of evaluators in the hiring process.
I used mixed effect models to test the hypothesis. The analysis results of the sample of
288 and 332 are almost identical because the missing data (i.e., missing-at-random)
carries no effect in mixed models (Howell 2012). Table 2.8 reports the statistical results
for the original dataset (n=332 with missing data) and an imputed dataset (n=332 with
imputed fee data). Assuming the missing values are missing at random, I utilized
Multiple Imputation (MI) to generate imputed data for the missing fee values. MI is a
statistical technique that replaces each missing value with a set of plausible values that
represent the uncertainty about the right value to impute (Rubin 1987). Five stimulated
complete datasets (imputation =5) were generated and combined to produce pooled
estimates as reported here. Table 2.8, Panel A reports the parameter estimates for the
fixed effects in the linear mixed models. Column (a) reports a significant result for
management influence (coefficient = 0.06; p = 0.034), which suggests that CPA firms use
words related to auditor independence in their audit proposals more frequently when
client management is involved in hiring auditors, compared to when an independent state
audit agency selects an auditor. Column (b) shows that the results hold for the imputed
16

With or without winsorization, the results are consistent. The data reported in Table 2.7 are winsorized.
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sample (MgtInf: coefficient = 2.50; p = 0.012). The results support H2 by indicating that
when management is involved in selecting an auditor in a public audit, CPA firms are
more likely to highlight an image of independent auditors in their audit proposals, as
compared to when an independent state agency selects the auditor.
< Insert Table 2.8 here >
H3 predicts that large and small firms will differ in their impression management
in audit proposals. Similar to H2, H3 is tested using the original and imputed sample.
Based on the results on Table 2.8, Columns (a) and (b), there is no evidence that larger
CPA firms highlight auditor independence in audit proposals more, or less, than do
smaller firms. Columns (c) to (h) report the estimated association between the
relationship marketing measures and firm size. In the original dataset, firm size is
positively associated with the relationship marketing measures: COP (coefficient = 0.10;
p<0.01), Trust (coefficient = 0.10; p<0.01), and CS coefficient = 0.47; p<0.01), as shown
in Column (c), (e), and (g), respectively. The positive associations are consistent with the
correlations reported in Table 2.6. The results suggest that Top100 CPA firms use words
related to the constructs of cooperation, trustworthy, and client satisfaction more
frequently in their proposals than do smaller firms. In other words, larger firms engage in
more relationship marketing strategies than do smaller firms. The results hold for the
imputed dataset as reported in Column (d), (f), and (h). Therefore, H3 is supported. It is
noteworthy that Fees, with or without imputed data, do not have an effect on the DVs.
Panel B in Table 2.8 reports the parameter estimated for the random effects in the
linear mixed models. The total variance estimate for each model is the sum of the
estimates in each column. An R² type of effect size used to gauge the importance of each
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random effect can be calculated by dividing each random effect's variance estimate by the
total variance estimate to arrive at a proportion of variance explained or accounted for by
each random effect. For example, I found that in Model 1 (Column (a)) the nested effect
of StateRC is 0.11 (=0.001/0.009), which means that the random nested effect accounts
for 11% of the variance of the random effects. On the other hand, the random effect for
FirmRC accounts for 66.67% (0.006/0.009) of the variance of the random effects.
Although the random effects for EngRC(StateRC) and StateRC do not account for
significant variance and can be eliminated from the models, I kept them in the model
since the AIC or BIC value does not improve (i.e., become smaller) after removing these
two random effects 17. Across the different models, FirmRC accounts for the most of the
variance of the random effects.
2.5.3. Supplemental Analysis
I ran a standard general linear model (GLM) for each dependent variable on the
variables of MgtInf, Top100, Fees, EngSize, WC, and FirmRC 18. The untabulated results
from the GLMs are consistent with those reported in the prior sections. The association
between INDP and MgtInf is significant at the 0.01 level (coefficient = 0.07, t = 3.891),
and a R2 of 76.8% indicates a well model fit. Top100 is significantly associated with the
RM measures (the coefficient on COP is 0.16 with a t-statistic of 2.192, on Trust is 0.205
with a t-statistic of 3.151, and on CS is 0.553 with a t-statistic of 2.417). The R2 for the
COP, Trust, and CS models are 76.1%, 70.2%, and 82.8%, respectively. In addition, a

17

The models reported here and in Table 2.8 have the lowest values in Akaike's Information Criterion
(AIC) and Schwarz's Bayesian Criterion (BIC). AIC and BIC are measures of the relative quality of a
statistical model for a given set of data (Dziak, Coffman, Lanza, and Li 2012). They are used as criteria for
selecting among nested models: the lower the number, the better the model fits the data.
18
FirmRC is included in the models because it accounts for the most of the variance of the random effects
as indicated in Table 2.8 Panel B.
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multivariate analysis 19 (MANOVA) reports a significant multivariate effect (p<0.01) for
the combined dependent variables in respect of MgtInf and Top100CPA (F=10.882 and
32.878, respectively).
In the Top100 CPA firm group, 24 out of 183 proposals (approx. 13%) are from
Big 4 accounting firms. To test whether the results for H3 are driven by the Big4 frims, I
performed two additional tests using mixed effect models. First, I removed the Big4
observations and re-ran the models (n=308), the results hold. The coefficient on COP is
0.10 with a t-statistic of 3.312, on Trust is 0.10 with a t-statistic of 3.543, and on CS is
0.47 with a t-statistic of 4.408. In the second test, I replaced the indicator Top100 with an
indicator Big4, which equals to one when an auditor is a Big4. The results indicate that
Big4 does not significantly predict the dependent variables (p>0.05). The additional
analysis shows that the results were not driven by the Big4 accounting firms.
As mentioned earlier in the sample selection section, I removed 38 proposals from
the primary analyses because they were submitted to multiple engagements and thus may
introduce noise. In the following untabulated supplemental tests, I included those
proposals in the sample (n=370) and ran the analyses to test my hypotheses. First, paired
samples tests indicate that the mean value of INDP is significantly different from that of
COP (t = -15.68; p<0.01), Trust (t = -11.35; p<0.01), and CS (t = -41.13; p<0.01), which
are consistent with the result from a one-way ANOVA contrast test (t = 41.53; p<0.01).
The supplemental results also support H1. Second, results from mixed effect models
indicate that Top100 is positively associated with the relationship marketing measures
and thus support H3: COP (coefficient = 0.09; p<0.01), Trust (coefficient = 0.09; p<0.01),

19

In the multivariate test, the dependent variables include INDP, COP, Trust, and CS; the predictors
include MgtInf, Top100, Fees, EngSize, and WC.
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and CS coefficient = 0.45; p<0.01). However, the mixed model results do not show a
significant positive association between INDP and MgtInf (coefficient = 0.04; p = 0.311).
A possible reason is that all of the 38 proposals are in the non-management involvement
group; the inclusion of those proposals in the sample increases the proportion of the nonmanagement involvement group (i.e., to 75%) and consequently distorts the results.
2.6.

Discussion, Limitations, and Summary
This study examines auditors’ marketing communications and impression

management strategies by investigating audit proposals and finds that CPA firms project
certain desirable images to their clients. Specifically, the firms highlight an image of a
cooperative, trustworthy service provider over an image of independent, objective auditor
in their proposals. The study results are consistent with prior findings. Zeff (2003)
suggests that auditors, while driven by their financial incentives, commit to meet clients’
desirability and preference; Fontaine and Pilote (2012) find that audit clients prefer a
cooperative, trusting, and long-term relationship with their auditors. In addition, auditors’
inherent self-serving biases, as suggested by Bazerman et al. (1997), can explain why
auditor independence can be vulnerable in a contracting process with a client.
Importantly, the study responds to a recent concern raised by the PCAOB about audit
firms’ marketing materials (PCAOB 2013). The board argues that a firm, while driven by
its commercial considerations, could use marketing language that is at odds with audit
quality and independence. Although the current study does not provide direct evidence
linking a firm’s marketing strategies with an actual impairment of auditor independence,
the findings indicate that CPA firms’ audit proposals contain extensive marketing
language, which may not support or advance auditor independence in appearance.
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The study also investigates whether client management’s influence on auditor
selection affects a CPA firm’s impression management strategies in a RFP process. The
degree of client management’s involvement in an audit procurement process varies from
state to state: in some states, the client management can weigh in during the evaluation
process of selecting an external auditor, but in others, they do not. Consistent with
Fiolleau’s et al. (2013) findings, this study suggest that auditors in a RFP process
strategically project different personae that respond to the decision makers' needs and
preferences. The results indicate that CPA firms portray more independence in the
proposals when management is involved in a selection process, as compared to when an
independent state agency is responsible to select the auditor. One possible explanation is
that managerial influence over auditor selection is believed to affect auditor
independence negatively (e.g., Carcello and Neal 2000, 2003); as a result, the issue of
auditor independence would attract more attention in a RFP process when client
management is involved in auditor selection decisions than when client management is
not. Consequently, to eliminate the concern about an impairment of auditor independence,
CPA firms are likely to emphasize the value of objectivity and portray more
independence in their proposals.
In addition, as mentioned earlier, Wilson and Stewart (1990) provide an
alternative explanation of why a governmental auditee is incentivized to demand
independent auditors and a high quality audit. They find that employment of an
independent CPA firm auditor and the quality of municipal financial information are
positively associated with increased competition in the primary market for new issues of
general obligation bonds. This explanation seems possible because over 50% of the
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government entities in this study sample issue municipal bonds, and the correlation
between bond issuance and client management involvement is significantly positive
(coefficient=0.16; p<0.01).
Lastly, prior research suggests that increasing competition in the audit market
provokes audit firms to adopt a marketing orientation and finds that audit firms undertake
more market activities in the past decades (e.g., Broberg, Umans, and Gerlofstig 2013).
This study further discovers that larger CPA firms engage in more relationship marketing
strategies while communicating with a potential client than do smaller firms. In fact, the
Big 4 audit firms spend significant resources in building and maintaining relationships
with their clients (Dhaliwal, Lamoreaux, Lennox, and Mauler 2014). The findings imply
that commercial considerations could drive CPA firms’ impression management and
jeopardize perceived independence of CPA firms in a contracting process. It raises a
concern whether those firms, while pursuing a close relationship with a client, develop an
organizational culture emphasizing profit and commercial gain over professional
independence and objectivity.
The study findings are subject to a number of limitations. First, an inherent
limitation of the linguistic approach (i.e., pure word counting based on customized
dictionaries) is that it ignores important context and background knowledge (Larcker and
Zakolyukina 2012). For example, simply counting words does not differentiate between
several meanings of words with the same appearance in the text or categorize
combinations of words or phrases that may imply different meanings from the constituent
words. Second, an assumption of the study is that text analysis can capture a particular
linguistic feature through a carefully developed dictionary. The dictionaries used in this
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study are developed and customized to capture target words related to image attributes.
The validity of the dictionaries can be subject to subjectivity if important dimensions are
overlooked. It would raise a concern about whether the word categories contain a
necessary set of words for business communication in audit proposals. To mitigate this
concern, I recruited several accounting professionals from state audit agencies to review
and validate the dictionaries used in the study. Third, the linguistic cues used to capture
the study constructs are selected based on a review of the audit proposals in the sample.
These audit proposals are submitted to governmental clients and thus may contain
different information from those used in the private sector, which could limit the study’s
ability of generalization. In addition, this study examines the audit proposals submitted
for government audit engagements in 15 U.S. states. Some states provided more audit
proposals than did others. State factors may drive the study results if the information
contained in audit proposals is significantly different across states. To address this
concern, I tested several characteristics of the in- and out-sample states and found no
significant differences across the states. Even though, the study may not generalize to the
omitted U.S. states or to the private sector.
In spite of the limitations discussed above, the study contributes to the literature
by creating a unique dataset of audit proposals and by developing and validating
linguistic categories that capture auditor independence and relationship marketing
language. The study also has important implications for regulators and practitioners.
Responding to the PCAOB’s (2013) concern about CPA firms' marketing materials, the
study examines the content of audit proposals for auditors’ marketing language and
suggests that firms’ impression management strategies may be at odds with auditor
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independence. The findings provide insight into why a firm’s assurance marketing
materials should be monitored for its marketing language.
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Table 2.1: Summary of Attributes
Attributes

Definition

Source

Independence

The state of mind that allows an auditor to
"act with integrity and exercise objectivity
and professional skepticism."

AICPA ET section
100-01

Cooperation

Auditors' willingness to assist and
mutually interact with clients to reach a
common goal.

Fontaine and Pilote
(2012);
Pinto and Pinto
(1990)

Trustworthy

Auditors are reliable and willing to
develop a long-term relationship with
clients.

Fontaine and Pilote
(2012);
Rennie, Kopp, and
Lemon (2010);
Morgan and Hunt
(1994)

Client Satisfaction

Client Satisfaction includes four
dimensions: Responsiveness, Empathy
(understanding), Value, and
Effectiveness. The definition of each
dimension is listed below.

Fontaine and Pilote
(2012); Duff
(2004, 2009); Payn
e and Jensen
(2002); Carcello et
al. (1992)

•
•
•
•

Responsiveness: auditors' ability to
react and tailor their service to client
needs;
Empathy: the degree of auditors'
understanding of the client's business
challenges;
Value: auditors' ability to provide
value-added services beyond the
required audit;
Effectiveness: auditors' ability and
commitment to complete the audit by
indicated deadline
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Table 2.2: Constructed Word Categories and Validity Statistics
Category

Abbreviation

List of words*

Alpha
reliability
(Binary/raw)**

Independence

INDP

ethical; ethics; impartial; impartiality;
independence; independent; neutral;
neutrality; objective; objectivity;
unbiased.

0.483/0.13

Cooperation

COP

0.649/0.1

Trustworthy

Trust

Client
Satisfaction

CS

assist; assistance; collaborate;
collaboration; communicate;
communicating; communication;
cooperate; cooperated; cooperation;
cooperative; cooperatively; coordinate;
coordination; open; partner; partnering;
teamwork; work-as-a-team; worktogether.
accountability; commit; commitment;
committed; confidence; confident;
confidential; confidentiality; fair;
fairly; fairness; honest; honestly;
honesty; promise; promising; relation;
relationship; relationships; reliability;
reliable; trust; trusted; trustful; trusting;
trustworthy.
accommodating; advice; advise;
advisory; beneficial; benefit; consult;
consultancy; consultant; consultation;
consulting; counsel; effective;
effectively; effectiveness; efficacy;
empathy, enthusiasm; guidance;
improve; improvement; need; needs;
recommend; recommendation;
responsive; responsiveness;
satisfaction; satisfied; satisfy; serve;
service; services; tailored; time;
timeline; timely; timing; understanding;
valuable; value.

0.684/0.308

0.823/0.678

Table 2.2 presents definitions of the linguistic-based variables that I use to estimate linear mixed models for
auditor image attributes. This table provides the words listed for each category.
* See the development of the word lists in Appendix A.
** As suggested by the LIWC2007 Manual, the alpha reliability is calculated based on the binary and
uncorrected methods. The binary method converts the usage of each of the single words within a given text
into either a 0 (not used) or a 1 (used one or more times). The uncorrected method is based on the
percentage of total words that each of the category words is used.
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Table 2.3: Sample of Audit Proposals by States
State

Number of
engagements

Number of audit
proposals (Top100)

Number of CPA
firms (Top100)

Colorado

19

82 (62)

17 (10)

Illinois

19

56 (32)

20 (9)

Indiana

2

10 (2)

10 (2)

Kansas

4

14 (9)

7 (5)

Kentucky*

40

40 (6)

27 (1)

Michigan

1

7 (3)

7 (3)

North Carolina

9

42 (30)

18 (11)

North Dakota

2

4 (4)

2 (2)

New Hampshire

1

2 (2)

2 (2)

New Jersey

2

6 (2)

6 (2)

Ohio

12

57 (5)

19 (4)

Oklahoma

4

20 (6)

11 (4)

Vermont

2

5 (3)

5 (3)

Virginia

5

31 (16)

15 (7)

Wyoming

1

2 (1)

2 (1)

123

378 (183)

133**(32)

TOTAL

*In Kentucky, CPA firms are allowed to submit one proposal for multiple engagements. For the 2010 and
2012 audit procurement, the Kentucky Auditors of Public Accounts contracted out the audits for 40
counties. Each engagement received an average of eight proposals that were also submitted to other
engagements.
** There are 133 CPA firms in the sample. The column total is greater than 133 because some CPA firms
participate in governmental audit procurement practices in multiple states.
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Table 2.4: Sample Characteristics
Total audit proposals

378

Real estate audit

( 8)
370

KY proposals

38
332

Missing fee data

44

Proposals without missing
values

288
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Table 2.5: Descriptive Statistics for Linguistic and Control Variablesa
Mean

Std. Dev

Min

Max

25th

50th

75th

Skew

Kurtosis

Panel A: Entire Sample (N=332)
INDP
COP
Trust
CS
affect
posemo
negemo
Fees
EngSize
WC

.17
.37
.29
1.56
2.78
2.36
.39

.10
.18
.15
.61
.73
.60
.33

.00
.00
.00
.45
1.23
1.22
.00

.54
1.19
1.05
3.59
5.51
4.51
2.08

.09
.23
.20
1.04
2.31
1.93
.16

.16
.34
.28
1.51
2.72
2.32
.27

.23
.48
.38
1.94
3.27
2.73
.57
492.03
7,285

.73
.69
1.03
.58
.54
.65
1.60
3.91
9.23
3.17

.51
.86
2.87
-.10
.41
.53
3.46
16.31
90.03
12.23

$395,955

903,048

12,450

6,437,721

50,550

105,443

259,375

1,187
6,679

5,379
5,570

.72
654

55,000
37,664

7.89
3,765

67.15
5,543

.37
.69
.54
2.77
4.12
3.50
.96
15.68
10.92
9.82

.09
.23
.20
1.04
2.31
1.93
.16
10.83
2.07
8.23

.16
.34
.28
1.51
2.72
2.32
.27
11.57
4.21
8.62

.23
.48
.38
1.94
3.27
2.73
.57
12.46
6.20
8.89

.38
.28
.06
.40
.20
.27
.74
.79
.20
-.42

-.58
-.72
-.46
-.61
-.59
-.52
-.58
.47
-.91
.95

Panel B: Transformation
INDP_W
COP_W
Trust_W
CS_W
Affect_W
Posemo_W
Negmo_W
Fees_ln
EngSize_ln
WC_ln

.17
.36
.29
1.55
2.76
2.34
.37
11.77
4.26
8.57

.10
.16
.13
.59
.69
.55
.27
1.33
2.56
.61

.00
.00
.00
.45
1.23
1.22
.00
9.43
-.33
6.48

Panel C: Top100 CPA Sample (N=183)
INDP_W
.17
COP_W
.43
Trust_W
.32
CS_W
1.81
Affect_W
2.90
Posemo_W
2.51
Negmo_W
.36
$555,279
Fees
EngSize
$1,953
WC
7,652

.09
.15
.12
.55
.69
.51
.27

.00
.09
.08
.48
1.49
1.33
.03

.37
.69
.54
2.77
4.12
3.50
.96

.09
.30
.24
1.46
2.40
2.15
.16

.16
.44
.32
1.85
2.85
2.48
.24

.22
.54
.40
2.11
3.44
2.86
.55

1,124,263

15,700

6,437,721

55,000

149,440

366,640

7,123
6,321

1
1,141

55,000
37,119

15
4,355

396
5,900

1,125
8,130
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.63
.01
.02
-.07
.14
.07
.94
3.01
6.93
2.83

-.18
-.82
-.68
-.39
-.85
-.38
-.21
9.06
46.99
8.48

Table 2.5 (continued)
Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

25th

50th

75th

Skew Kurtosis

Panel D: Non-Top100 CPA Sample (N=149)
INDP_W
0.17
COP_W
0.28
Trust_W
0.24
CS_W
1.22
Affect_W
2.59
Posemo_W
2.13
Negmo_W
0.39
$188,197
Fees
EngSize
244.79
WC
5,483

0.11
0.14
0.13
0.44
0.64
0.53
0.28

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.45
1.23
1.22
0.00

0.37
0.69
0.54
2.77
4.12
3.50
0.96

0.07
0.18
0.17
0.94
2.08
1.76
0.16

0.16
0.25
0.22
1.09
2.61
2.07
0.32

0.25
0.36
0.32
1.47
3.00
2.40
0.61

0.18
0.79
0.30
1.11
0.20
0.71
0.53

-0.88
0.54
-0.05
1.41
-0.27
0.14
-0.88

399,109

12,450

3,680,000

44,300

100,000

174,388

6.61

51.31

816.86
4,217

0.72
654

6,719.17
37,664

4.05
3,025

20.10
4,812

130.22
6,795

5.67
3.67

35.62
23.16

Panel E: Management Involvement Sample (N=92)
INDP_W
0.20
COP_W
0.31
Trust_W
0.26
CS_W
1.29
Affect_W
2.95
Posemo_W
2.29
Negmo_W
0.56
$486,887
Fees
EngSize
387
WC
7,462

0.09
0.15
0.11
0.48
0.57
0.56
0.27

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.61
1.85
1.36
0.00

0.37
0.69
0.54
2.77
4.12
3.50
0.96

0.15
0.19
0.20
0.95
2.56
1.84
0.33

0.19
0.26
0.24
1.15
2.86
2.19
0.55

0.26
0.38
0.34
1.46
3.27
2.58
0.80

-0.05
0.99
-0.13
1.50
0.39
0.80
-0.07

0.24
0.58
0.52
2.16
-0.29
-0.09
-1.09

1,135,227

14,400

6,437,721

87,900

128,655

272,345

3.79

14.20

1,112
6,761

1.81
654

5,017
37,664

7.89
3,821

21.80
6,033

130.22
8,140

3.60
2.81

11.95
8.89

0.14
0.38
0.30
1.70
2.60
2.36
0.21

0.21
0.51
0.39
1.97
3.26
2.76
0.44

Panel F: Non-Management Involvement Sample (N=240)
INDP_W
0.15
COP_W
0.38
Trust_W
0.30
CS_W
1.65
Affect_W
2.69
Posemo_W
2.36
Negmo_W
0.30
$353,951
Fees
EngSize
1,487
WC
6,378

0.10
0.17
0.13
0.59
0.71
0.55
0.24

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.45
1.23
1.22
0.00

0.37
0.69
0.54
2.77
4.12
3.50
0.96

0.07
0.25
0.20
1.19
2.13
1.99
0.13

772,489

12,450

4,737,961

41,950

83,800

257,750

3.55

12.69

6,248
5,024

0.72
949

55,000
37,119

5.47
3,691

108.40
5,261

630.44
6,977

7.98
3.28

66.24
13.78
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0.61
0.04
0.01
0.08
0.27
0.07
1.20

-0.41
-0.75
-0.72
-0.66
-0.69
-0.57
0.69

Table 2.5 (continued)
a

Variable Definitions:
INDP = Self-constructed category of independence. For the definition and the complete
list of words, see Table 2.1 and 2.2. Simple count of matched words in the
category divided by the number of total words ignoring articles in a given
proposal.
COP = Self-constructed category of cooperation. For the definition and the complete
list of words, see Table 2.1 and 2.2. Simple count of matched words in the
category divided by the number of total words ignoring articles in a given
proposal.
Trust = Self-constructed category of trust. For the definition and the complete list of
words, see Table 2.1 and 2.2. Simple count of matched words divided in the
category by the number of total words ignoring articles in a given proposal.
CS = Self-constructed category of client satisfaction. For the definition and the
complete list of words, see Table 2.1 and 2.2. Simple count of matched words
in the category divided by the number of total words ignoring articles in a
given proposal.
affect = LIWC default category capturing psychological affective processes. Simple
count divided by the number of words ignoring articles.
posemo = Positive affect. Simple count divided by the number of words ignoring articles.

negemo = Negative affect. Simple count divided by the number of words ignoring
articles.
Fees = Proposed audit fee per audit proposal.
EngSize = Auditee’s operating expenses (in millions) in the prior year.
WC = Raw number of words per audit proposal
Variable_W = Winsorized value of the variable
Variable_ln = Natural logarithm value of the variable
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Table 2.6: Cross-Correlation Matrixa
MgtInf

Top100

INDP

COP

Trust

CS

Fees

EngSize

WC

MgtInf

1.000**

-.494**

.286**

-.228**

-.155**

-.288**

.165**

-.257**

.061**

Top100

-.494**

1.000**

.029**

.486**

.330**

.537**

.161**

.382**

.232**

INDP

.270**

.037**

1.000**

.095**

.272**

.252**

-.005**

.043**

.147**

COP

-.220**

.470**

.078**

1.000**

.396**

.587**

.006**

.252**

-.061**

Trust

-.167**

.319**

.275**

.371**

1.000**

.514**

-.089**

.116**

-.103**

CS

-.276**

.517**

.224**

.562**

.494**

1.000**

-.089**

.178**

-.133**

Fees

.134**

.199**

.035**

.002**

-.077**

-.092**

1.000**

.609**

.344**

EngSize

-.237**

.374**

.049**

.221**

.086**

.123**

.652**

1.000**

.268**

WC

-.004**

.283**

.151**

-.015**

-.038**

-.107**

.402**

.320**

1.000**

a

This table provides correlations among the variables used in subsequent tests. Spearman
(Pearson) correlations are above (below) the diagonal.
**,* Indicate two-tailed significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively.
Variable Definitions:
MgtInf
Top100

=
=

INDP

=

COP

=

Trust

=

CS

=

Fees
EngSize

=
=

WC

=

1 if client management helps to select the auditor, and 0 otherwise;
1 if the audit firm is listed as a Top100 CPA firm by Accounting Today, and
0 otherwise;
Self-constructed category of independence. Simple count of matched words in
the category divided by the number of total words ignoring articles in a given
proposal. The data is transformed by winsorizing at the 95% percentile.
Self-constructed category of cooperation. Simple count of matched words in
the category divided by the number of total words ignoring articles in a given
proposal. The data is transformed by winsorizing at the 95% percentile.
Self-constructed category of trust. Simple count of matched words in the
category divided by the number of total words ignoring articles in a given
proposal. The data is transformed by winsorizing at the 95% percentile.
Self-constructed category of client satisfaction. Simple count of matched
words in the category divided by the number of total words ignoring articles
in a given proposal. The data is transformed by winsorizing at the 95%
percentile.
Natural logarithm of proposed audit fees;
Natural logarithm of auditee’s operating expenses (in millions) in the prior
year.
Natural logarithm of winsorized word count per audit proposal
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Table 2.7: Paired Sample T-Test
Pair Differences
Mean

Std. Deviation

t

Sig.
(2-tailed)

Panel A: N=332
Pair 1

INDP - COP

-.20

.19

-18.99

.000

Pair 2

INDP - Trust

-.12

.14

-15.57

.000

Pair 3

INDP - CS

-1.38

.58

-43.72

.000

Panel B: N=288
Pair 1

INDP - COP

-.20

.19

-18.64

.000

Pair 2

INDP - Trust

-.13

.14

-15.79

.000

Pair 3

INDP - CS

-1.39

.60

-39.36

.000

Variable Definitions:
INDP = Self-constructed category of independence. Simple count of matched words
divided by the number of total words ignoring articles in a given proposal. The
data is transformed by winsorizing at the 95% percentile.
COP = Self-constructed category of cooperation. Simple count of matched words
divided by the number of total words ignoring articles in a given proposal. The
data is transformed by winsorizing at the 95% percentile.
Trust = Self-constructed category of trust. Simple count of matched words divided by
the number of total words ignoring articles in a given proposal. The data is
transformed by winsorizing at the 95% percentile.
CS = Self-constructed category of client satisfaction. Simple count of matched words
divided by the number of total words ignoring articles in a given proposal. The
data is transformed by winsorizing at the 95% percentile.
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Table 2.8: Results From Linear Mixed Effect Models
Panel A: Estimates of Fixed Effects
DV
Column

INDP___

___ _ COP__ _

____Trust__ _

_____CS____

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

(g)

(h)

N=332

N=332
MI

N=332

N=332
MI

N=332

N=332
MI

N=332

N=332
MI

β
p-value

β
p-value

β
p-value

β
p-value

β
p-value

β
p-value

β
p-value

β
p-value

Intercept

-0.100
(0.239)

-2.93
(0.003)

0.41
(0.009)

-0.75
(0.451)

0.42
(0.002)

-2.66
(0.008)

2.24
(0.000)

0.95
(0.340)

MgtInf

0.060
(0.034)

2.50
(0.012)

0.03
(0.604)

-0.06
(0.950)

0.01
(0.697)

0.20
(0.843)

-0.06
(0.794)

-0.58
(0.561)

Top100

0.010
(0.549)

0.04
(0.971)

0.10
(0.001)

3.15
(0.002)

0.10
(0.001)

3.01
(0.003)

0.47
(0.000)

4.25
(0.000)

Fees

-0.010
(0.206)

0.03
(0.974)

-0.01
(0.566)

0.91
(0.365)

0.00
(0.587)

-0.72
(0.474)

EngSize

-0.000
(0.836)

-0.48
(0.633)

0.00
(0.496)

-0.55
(0.583)

0.00
(0.508)

-0.94
(0.351)

0.01
(0.624)

-0.07
(0.947)

WC

0.040
(0.000)

3.29
(0.001)

-0.01
(0.477)

0.99
(0.318)

-0.02
(0.249)

3.11
(0.002)

-0.11
(0.012)

-0.37
(0.715)

Parameter

-0.01
(0.683)

-0.70
(0.484)

Panel B: Estimates of Covariance Parameters
INDP___

___ _ COP__ _

____Trust__ _

_____CS____

Column

(a)

Parameter

N=332

N=332
MI

N=332

N=332
MI

N=332

N=332
MI

N=332

N=332
MI

Residual
EngRC
(StateRC)
StateRC

0.002**

0.003**

0.007**

0.007**

0.006**

0.006**

0.050**

0.052**

0.000**

0.000**

0.003**

0.002**

0.001**

0.001**

0.004**

0.005**

0.001**

0.002**

0.004**

0.004**

0.001**

0.001**

0.120**

0.116**

FirmRC

0.006**

0.006**

0.008**

0.009**

0.009**

0.008**

0.150**

0.157**

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

**,* Indicate two-tailed significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively.
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(g)

(h)

Table 2.8 (continued)
Variable Definitions:
DV:
INDP =
COP =
Trust =
CS =

Simple count of words related to independence divided by the number of words
ignoring articles. The data is transformed by winsorizing at the 95% percentile.
Simple count of words related to cooperation divided by the number of words
ignoring articles. The data is transformed by winsorizing at the 95% percentile.
Simple count of words related to trust divided by the number of words ignoring
articles. The data is transformed by winsorizing at the 95% percentile.
Simple count of words related to client satisfaction divided by the number of
words ignoring articles. The data is transformed by winsorizing at the 95%
percentile.

Predictors:
MgtInf =
Top100 =
Fees =
EngSize =
WC
EngRC
StateRC
FirmRC

=
=
=
=

1 if client management helps to select the auditor, and 0 otherwise;
1 if the audit firm is listed as a Top100 CPA firm by Accounting Today, and 0
otherwise;
Natural logarithm of proposed audit fees;
Natural logarithm of auditee’s operating expenses (in millions) in the prior
year.
Natural logarithm of raw number of words per audit proposal
Recording engagement into a nominal scaled variable
Recording state into a nominal scaled variable
Recording CPA firm into a nominal scaled variable
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Chapter 3
Study 2: Auditor Selection and Perceived Audit Quality Attributes
3.1.

Introduction
Many U.S. state and local governments utilize external CPA firms for basic

financial statement audits and single audits. Depending on the state, either a state audit
agency or a government entity can issue a request for proposal (RFP) to solicit audit
services. CPA firms can then respond by submitting audit proposals, which generally
describe the qualification of the firm, background of the team members, audit plans and
procedures, and estimated audit fees. Study 2 discusses audit procurement practices in the
public sector and investigates the determinants of auditor choice in a government RFP
process. Specifically, this study examines the following two research questions. First, do
audit service quality attributes contained in audit proposals predict auditor selection in a
RFP process, and if so, which attributes are most predictive of choice? Second, does
political competition and the risk of corruption influence audit procurement quality?
Governmental auditing is one cornerstone of good public sector governance
(ALGA 2014). Auditors perform an especially important function in promoting
credibility, equity, accountability, and appropriate behavior of public sector officials,
while reducing the risk of public corruption (IIA 2012). More importantly, an effective
governmental audit can increase citizens and stakeholders’ ability to evaluate and
monitor public officials’ performance and thus instill confidence in government.
Therefore, it is crucial that a governmental entity utilize a RFP process to hire a qualified
auditor who provides a high quality audit. The General Accounting Office (GAO 1986)
and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA 1987) deem well-
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designed audit procurement practices (e.g., the receipt of competitive proposals from
prospective CPA firms) as a mechanism for ensuring audit quality. However, even
though procurements for audit services are common in the public sector, few studies
investigate how government clients select auditors. Moreover, political scandals
involving high-level officials receiving payments from private companies awarded
through government contracts illustrate that government officials hold considerable
discretionary powers in awarding contracts, even with state regulation of the procurement
process 20. Thus, understanding audit procurement quality and the factors affecting the
procurement quality is important to regulators, public officials, and the public.
Product differentiation theory suggests that audit firms will highlight certain
desirable attributes in their marketing materials in order to differentiate themselves from
competitors and increase their attractiveness to prospective clients. Based on agency
theory (e.g., Banker and Patton 1987), I hypothesize that, to mitigate agency problems,
government clients will select an auditor who is perceived to provide good quality audit
services. This study content analyzed audit proposals to examine whether linguistic cues
related to three image attributes (independence, competence, and relationship marketing)
along with other perceived audit quality attributes can predict auditor choice in a
government RFP process. I used discrete choice models (e.g., Train 2007) to fit the data;
the results indicate that descriptions of auditor’s competence in audit proposals have
predictive power in auditor selection decisions in the public sector. In other words,
auditors who highlight competence and qualification in their proposals are more likely to

20

For example, Natividad Lara Cervantes, former U.S. Department of Defense contract supervisor, used his
position and influence over millions of dollars in government contracts to extort over $100,000 in bribes
from 2008 to 2011. In January 2014, Cervantes pledged guilty to charges involving bribery and kickbacks
related to the awarding of construction and service contracts at Camp Pendleton (USA v. Cervantes, 2014).
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be selected by government clients. Moreover, prior relationships between auditors and
clients statistically significantly predict auditor selection. That is, government clients are
inclined to hire a predecessor auditor in a RFP process. Environmental factors, political
competition and perceived corruption risk, do not seem to affect auditor selection
decisions or the quality of audit procurement practices.
This study discusses governmental audit procurement processes, auditor selection
procedures in a RFP process, and the factors influencing the effectiveness of audit
procurement practices. The findings provide insights into the key attributes that affect
auditor selection outcomes in the public sector. This paper contributes to auditing
research in several ways. First, audit proposals are a key element in audit procurement
practices; however, RFPs have received little attention in the literature 21. The unique
hand-collected dataset of the present study facilitates our understanding of governmental
audit procurement practices and CPA firms' marketing communications. Second, this
study expands the auditing literature in perceived audit quality. To date, research
generally surveys audit clients' to assess their self-reported, perceived audit quality
attributes (e.g., Schroeder, Solomom, and Vickrey 1986; Carcello et al. 1992; Duff 2009).
This study examines audit firms’ marketing materials and investigates whether the
linguistics cues reflecting perceived audit service qualities affect clients’ auditor selection
decisions. The results inform practicing auditors by suggesting that government clients
highly value auditors’ competence and that using language describing the auditor’s
ability can influence clients’ choice of auditors. Lastly, this study employs emerging
21

To my knowledge, there is one study investigating RFPs (Fiolleau et al 2013). In their study, the authors
investigate how regulatory reforms designed to promote auditor independence may actually work in the
context of auditor change. They examined seven RFP proposals in the private and public sector and
reported data from only one private company. The current study collects 378 audit proposals and looks into
the determinants of auditor selection decisions in the public sector.
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corpus linguistic and text analytic methods to analyze audit proposals and reveal the
implicit promises made by auditors to their public sector audit clients. This paper is
among the first to create word categories that capture the promises made by auditors to
their clients in RFPs.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 provides the study background and
the supporting theories. Section 3.3 discusses the development of hypotheses, Section 3.4
describes the methodology and the measurements of variables, and Section 3.5 provides
descriptive statistics and analysis results. The summary of the study is provided at
Section 3.6.
3.2.

Background and Theory

3.2.1. Governmental Audits and Procurement Practices
Governmental entities that expend $500,000 or more in federal awards are
required by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to comply with the audit and
internal control requirements of Circular A-133 (OMB 2003). Governmental audits
include audits performed under the Single Audit Act Amendments of 1996 and OMB
Circular A-133, Audits of States, Local Governments and Non-Profit
Organizations (referred to as single audits), program specific audits as defined under
OMB Circular A-133, and other compliance audits and attestation engagements
performed as required by federal, state, or local laws and regulations. Such audits for
non-federal entities must be conducted by a public accountant or a government audit
agency, which meets the general standards specified in generally accepted government
auditing standards (GAGAS).

55

Federal outlays for grants to state and local governments increased from $91
billion in fiscal year 1980 to about $606 billion in fiscal year 2011 (GAO 2012).
Increases in federal grants to state and local governments invoke a variety of grant
management challenges 22 and raise the awareness about the importance of government
audits (e.g., Deis and Giroux 1994; Saito and Mcintosh 2010). Failure to meet these grant
management challenges may invite financial corruption and fraudulent activities in
government agencies. In fact, corruption is a growing problem in the United States; for
example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) lists public corruption as one of its
top criminal investigative priorities (FBI 2010). In the past decade, numerous state and
local officials were accused of bribery, extortion, and/or embezzlement; many pled guilty
and were sentenced in prison. For example, Rita Crundwell, former Comptroller of the
city of Dixon, Illinois, was indicted for committing perhaps the largest municipal fraud in
U.S. history. She was sentenced to 19 years and 7 months in prison for allegedly
embezzling as much as $54 million over 22 years and using the proceeds to finance her
horse breeding business and lifestyle (Jenco 2012). Undoubtedly, the occurrence of
political corruption manifests the importance of a quality audit of public resources. The
GAO suggests that improving the single audit process as an effective accountability
mechanism helps to address grant management challenges (GAO 2012). The Government
Finance Officers Association (GFOA) argues that an effective government audit plays an
essential role in signaling the integrity of the public financial management and disclosure
and in enhancing taxpayers' confidence in elected officials (GFOA 2002).

22

GAO (2012) grouped grants management challenges involving federal grants to state and local
governments into five topic areas: (1) challenges related to effectively measuring grant performance, (2)
uncoordinated grant program creation, (3) need for better collaboration, (4) internal control weaknesses,
and (5) lack of agency or recipient capacity.
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The GAO (1987) and the AICPA (1987) consider well-designed audit
procurement practices as a mechanism for ensuring audit quality23. The GFOA (2002)
also recommends that governmental entities undertake a competitive audit procurement
process that emphasizes the auditor's competence to perform a quality audit as a
determining factor in hiring. Furthermore, it is important to understand governmental
entities' practices in auditor selection for the following two reasons. First, the risk of
auditor moral hazard 24 is perceived to be greater in the governmental environment
because the probability of client financial failure and the subsequent threat of litigation
are relatively low (Raman and Wilson 1994). Second, the GAO had issued two reports
addressing CPA audit quality, which indicated that CPAs did not comply with
professional auditing standards in many cases (GAO 1985; 1986). In a recent report, the
GAO highlights the existence of continuing deficiencies in federal audits performed by
CPA firms when compared to those performed by governmental auditors over the period
2003-2004 (GAO 2007). An appropriately structured audit procurement practice, as
suggested by the GFOA (2002), can reduce the frequency of audit deficiencies by
screening out incompetent and unethical auditors.
Although the audit and internal control requirements of Circular A-133 hold for
all U.S. states, considerable diversity exists across states in audit procurement policies,
regulations, and procedures. According to the National Association of State Auditors,

23

For example, a GAO study (1987) identifies several critical attributes for an effective procurement
practice, which include the use of an effective solicitation process, the receipt of competitive bids from
prospective CPA firms, the technical evaluation of proposals, the consideration of multi-year audit
agreements, and the use of a written agreement documenting the expectations between the successful audit
firm and the municipality.
24
Moral hazard occurs under a type of information asymmetry where a risk-taking agent knows more about
his/her intentions than the principal paying the consequences of the risk. Auditor moral hazard relates to
auditors’ effort supply and/or truthful reporting (e.g., Dye, Balachandran, and Magee 1990; De and Sen
1997).
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Comptrollers and Treasurers (NASACT 2012), the state audit agency serves as the
primary auditor of the basic financial statements in 34 states and the single audits in 13
states. CPA firms conduct all basic financial statement audits in 11 states and the single
audits in 10 states. In 26 states, the state auditor and CPA firms conduct the single audits
jointly. The responsibility of selecting CPA firms goes to different parties across states.
In 23 states, the state audit agency is fully responsible for initiating a RFP process to
contract out the single audits; in all other states, the audited agency selects its own auditor.
In the latter circumstance, the state audit agency may or may not be required to supervise
or monitor the audit procurement process conducted by the individual audited agency 25.
Nevertheless, no matter which procurement procedure a state adopts, agency costs, just
like in the private sector, should influence auditor selection decisions in the public sector
(e.g., Bandyopadhyay and Kao 2010; Tate 2007). The next section reviews auditor
selection and agency theory in the auditing literature.
3.2.2. Auditor Selection and Agency Theory
The auditing literature often discusses demand and supply influences on auditor
selection. From the demand side, the literature widely uses agency demand (e.g., Jensen
and Meckling 1976; Francis and Wilson 1988), information demand (e.g., Elliott and
Jacobson 1994; Moore and Ronen 1990), and insurance demand 26 (e.g., Piot 2005) to
explain the determinants of auditor choice in the commercial sector. However, for the
following reasons this study does not consider information demand or insurance demand
25

The state information is from a publication of the National Association of State Auditors, Comptrollers
and Treasurers: Auditing in the States: A Summary, 2012 Edition.
26
Agency theory supports agency demand, which refers to a demand of principals and their agents for a
quality audit as a monitoring device to enhance the reliability of accounting information and reduce agency
costs. Information demand arises from information asymmetries, which refer to a demand for a quality
audit that signals management's integrity and the credibility of financial statements to investors. Insurance
demand refers to a demand of principals for a reputed auditor who offers extended collateral guarantees to
indemnify investors and creditors against financial loss (i.e., auditors' deep pockets).
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a great concern for auditor selection in the public sector. First, most, if not all, states have
enforced transparency policies that require them to provide information about their
operations and decisions online and readily available to the public. Government
transparency mitigates information demand by reducing information asymmetry between
governmental agencies and the public. For example, the data set (i.e., audit proposals) in
this study was obtained through submitting open records requests to state audit agencies;
a similar dataset, however, is not available from the private sector. Second, governmental
agencies are less likely to experience a financial failure compared to public traded
corporations. The governmental environment diminishes the insurance demand for
auditing because the probability is relatively low of taxpayers suing auditors for damages
or losses resulting from audit deficiencies. The subsequent threat of litigation to auditor is
correspondingly reduced (Raman and Wilson 1994).
On the other hand, as in the private sector, the principal-agent problem is
prevalent in the public sector. Agency problems occur when the incentives or goals
between the principal and the agent imperfectly align (i.e., conflicts of interest) and the
principal cannot easily verify that the agent has behaved in the principal's best interests.
Under these conditions, agency theory predicts that agents may not act upon the best
interest of principals. Researchers (e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976; Francis and Wilson
1988) have used agency theory to explain corporations' selection of auditors (i.e., a
demand perspective) in the private sector. Agency theory predicts that misaligned
incentives between shareholders and managers will result in higher agency costs,
especially in corporations where managers have a relatively low level of share ownership
(Jensen and Meckling 1976). The theory further suggests that the selection of auditors
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signals management's integrity and that audit services function as monitoring devices to
increase the credibility and the reliability of management and accounting information
(Dopuch and Simunic 1982). That is, agency problems induce a need for an independent
audit (e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976; Wallace 2004); companies with lower
management shareholding should demand a higher quality audit to reduce agency costs
from self-serving management (e.g., Firth and Smith 1992; Hope, Langli, and Thomas
2012) compared to companies with higher management shareholding (e.g., family-owned
business).
In the public sector, Banker and Patton (1987) propose that agency theory can
help explain municipal audit practices, relationships between citizens and elected
officials, and the role of state auditors versus external auditors. Agency theory suggests
that the principal-agent problem exists when the incentives of government officials are
misaligned with those of the public. Government officials may not act upon the best
interest of the principals when conflicts of interest occur. The Crundwell case mentioned
earlier is a good example demonstrating the conflicts of interest between the principal
and the agent in the public sector. Raman and Wilson (1994) believe that audits of
governmental entities help control the agency problem with respect to the actions of
public officials. Although some argue that the agency theory characterization of
politicians and their constituents imperfectly maps from the profit sector, Wallace (2004)
point out that, due to the attributes of political markets, commitments to monitoring
activities (i.e., agency demand) by the incumbent can avert political competition.
To summarize, this study considers agency demand as a determinant of auditor
choice and uses agency theory to develop the study hypothesis. Because audit
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procurement involves both a demand and supply side, the next section discusses audit
services from a supply perspective by reviewing product differentiation theory, which
supports the hypothesis that differentiated audit quality attributes are valued by audit
purchasers.
3.2.3. Product Differentiation Theory
Dickson and Ginter (1987, p. 6) define product differentiation as “offering a
product that is perceived to differ from the competing products on at least one element of
a vector of physical and nonphysical product characteristics.” An inevitable premise of
product positioning is to meet client differentiation demand (Chen and Zhu 2009).
Product positioning refers to a process through which marketers attempt to communicate
their products’ attributes to target customers and create a distinct impression in the
customers’ mind (e.g., Lamb 2012). In auditing, the product differentiation hypothesis
traces to Dopuch and Simunic (1982) and DeAngelo (1981) whose studies suggest
demands for different levels of audit quality. This stream of research often investigates
the effect of audit-firm and individual auditor characteristics on audit quality and auditor
choice. The arguments of the studies often refer to agency costs, which are widely used to
explain demand for quality-differentiated audits (Watts and Zimmerman 1983). Jensen
and Meckling (1976) proposes that clients’ demand for audit quality arises from the
incentives to reduce agency costs they faced. Therefore, differential agency costs across
firms or even for a given firm across time may invoke heterogeneous demands for audit
services in terms of quality (DeAngelo 1981). Many studies using data from different
countries (e.g., U.S., France, UK, China, Canada, etc.) in support of the claim that agency
costs explain the choice of audit quality (e.g., DeFond 1992; Francis, Richard, and
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Vanstraelen 2009; Khalil, Magnan, and Cohen 2008; Lennox 2005; Wang, Wong, and
Xia 2008).
The auditing literature provides empirical evidence on the existence of audit
quality differentiation in audit markets. Although the empirical results for audit price
differentials are mixed 27, research generally supports product differentiation by
evidencing the Big N price premium in audit markets 28. In addition, research suggests
that audit services are quality differentiated in terms of audit firm size. For example,
DeAngelo (1981) suggests that audit quality partially depends on auditor firm size and
that large audit firms are perceived as higher quality suppliers. Francis and Yu (2009)
further provide evidence that larger Big 4 offices produce higher quality audits.
Numerous studies support the association between firm size and a variety of audit-quality
proxies (e.g. Krishnan and Schauer 2000; Khurana and Raman 2004; Geiger and Rama
2006; Behn, Choi, and Kang 2008). An explanation for this association is that larger audit
firms are motivated to perform high-quality audits as their reputations are more valuable
(DeAngelo 1981). In fact, auditor reputation also differentiates audit firms. For example,
the GAO (2003) reports that reputation is a key factor in managers' choices of auditor.
Barton (2005) further provides evidence that firms build and preserve their reputations
for credible financial reporting by engaging highly reputable auditors.
Audit clients and capital markets also view industry expertise as an indicator of
differential audit quality. A number of studies support the assertion that firm-level
27

For example, Simunic (1980) found no significant differences in prices throughout the large and small
segments of the U.S. market, and Chaney et al. (2004) find that there is no Big N premium when they
control for self-selection bias.
28
This stream of research uses data from various countries, including the U.S. (e.g., Palmrose 1986; Simon
and Francis 1988), the United Kingdom (e.g., Chan, Ezzamel, and Gwilliam 1993), Australian (Francis
1984; Francis and Stokes 1986), Japan (Taylor 1997), and Hong Kong (e.g., Simon, Teo, and Trompeter
1992; Gul 1999).
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industry expertise produces higher quality audits (e.g., Balsam, Krishnan, and Yang 2003;
Gramling and Stone 2001; Krishnan 2003, 2005). Recently, the focus of industry
expertise has shifted from the firm to the office (e.g., Ferguson et al. 2003) or individual
level (e.g., Carcello and Nagy 2004). Using data from Taiwan, Chin and Chi (2009) find
that expertise at the individual level (i.e., signing partners) is positively associated with
audit quality with respect to a likelihood of accounting restatements. Further, their
evidence suggests that the differential restatement likelihood due to industry expertise is
mainly attributable to partner-level, rather than firm-level, expertise. In a recent study,
Zerni (2012) uses Swedish data to examine auditor specialization at the individual partner
level; his findings, consistent with Chin and Chi’s, suggest that client firms infer audit
quality at least partially from the specialization of the individual audit partner in charge.
The studies discussed above support differentiation in audit quality using different
quality proxies. The proxies were used because the credence attributes of auditing
prevent an audit client from precisely observing how well an audit was performed
(Causholli and Knechel 2012). For example, information asymmetry, a credence feature,
makes it impractical, or impossible, for the client to directly assess audit quality prior to,
during, and sometimes even after the audit. As a result, perceived quality attributes are
used to signal audit service quality. The next section discusses several audit quality
attributes from the perceptions of auditors, clients, and financial statement users.
3.2.4. Perceived Audit Quality Attributes
One stream of auditing research uses survey data to discover attributes perceived
to affect audit quality. Schroeder et al. (1986) argue that two types of factors, teamspecific characteristics and firm-wide characteristics, influence audit committee
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chairpersons' ex ante appraisals of audit quality. Using a questionnaire, they examine 81
audit committee chairpersons’ perceptions of the impact on audit quality of 15 attributes
and find that audit team factors are perceived as more important than firm-wide factors.
Expanding Schroeder's et al. work, Carcello et al. (1992) examine audit quality attribute
perceptions of 245 audit partners, 264 preparers, and 120 financial statement users.
Factor analysis reduces 41 quality attributes to 12 factors. The most important audit
quality factors were: audit team and firm experience with the client, industry expertise,
CPA firm responsiveness to client needs, and CPA firm compliance with general audit
standards 29. Due to changes in audit markets in the past decade (e.g., regulatory
constraints, globalization of business, commercialization of practice), Duff (2004, 2009)
revisits this issue of the perceptions of audit quality using data from the United Kingdom
(UK). He develops a multidimensional, structured model of audit quality, AUDITQUAL,
to capture the hypothesized dimensions of audit quality. AUDITQUAL consists of nine
dimensions within four higher-order factors of competence (reputation, capability, and
assurance), independence, relationships (expertise and experience) and service qualities
(empathy, non-audit services, and responsiveness). Among those four higher-order
factors, independence and competence have widely been recognized as two critical
fundamental attributes of audit quality, which is consistent with DeAngelo’s (1981)
definition of audit quality. She defines audit quality as a product of auditors' ability to
discover (i.e., competence) and report (i.e., independence) a breach in clients' accounting
system.

29

The remaining 8 factors include CPA firm commitment to quality, CPA firm executive involvement,
conduct of audit fieldwork, involvement of audit committee, individual team member characteristics, CPA
firm personnel maintain skeptical attitude, CPA firm personnel maintain freshness of perspective, and
degree of individual responsibility.
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Other studies have examined client perceptions of the audit quality attributes
associated with client satisfaction, auditor change, and auditor selection. For example,
Beattie and Fearnley (1995) reveal fundamental aspects of the auditor choice process and
explore audit clients' views of the desirability of audit firm characteristics (i.e., product
differentiation from audit clients' perspective) based on questionnaire responses from 210
listed UK companies. Their findings suggest that the technical competence of firm
service is the most important characteristic to respondents, followed by the integrity of
the firm and the quality of working relationship with audit partner(s). In addition, using
factor analysis, they identify eight orthogonal audit firm dimensions 30 of importance to
audit clients. Their study provides empirical support for the arguments about differentials
in audit quality (DeAngelo 1981), firm reputations and brand names (Dopuch and
Simunic 1982), and specialist knowledge (Simunic and Stein 1987). Similar to Beattie
and Fearnley (1995), Behn et al. (1997) and Iskandar et al. (2010) link several audit
quality attributes 31 to audit client satisfaction. The most recent work related to perceived
audit quality attributes is Butcher's et al. (2013) study, which employs Duff's model to
hypothesize and measure audit quality. They find evidence that the higher-order audit
quality factors of relationship and service qualities are associated with auditor retention.

30

Including reputation/quality, acceptability to third parties, value for money, ability to provide non-audit
services, small audit firm, specialist industry knowledge, non-Big Six large audit firm, and geographical
proximity.
31
Analyzing survey responses from 434 controllers of Fortune 1000 companies, Behn et al (1997) find a
significant, positive relationship between various audit quality attributes and client satisfaction, including
responsiveness to client needs, executive involvement, effective and ongoing interaction with the audit
committee, conduct of field work, industry expertise, etc. Using Malaysian data, Iskandar et al. (2010)
found that client satisfaction is significant related audit firm quality attributes (i.e., prior experience,
responsiveness, independence, and commitment of audit firm to quality audit) and audit team quality
attributes (i.e., experience with client, independence, involvement in the engagement, conduct of field
works, and ethical and knowledgeable of accounting and auditing standards).
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The findings of the studies in audit quality attributes imply that dimensions of
audit quality go beyond technical qualities 32, to include features of service quality. This
view is supported by a recent PCAOB discussion of audit quality indicators (AQI) and
the development of an audit quality framework (PCAOB 2013). The framework defines
AQIs as measures for three essential elements of audit quality: audit inputs, audit
processes, and audit results. The Board believes that AQIs provide insight into financial
statement audit quality and help audit clients and investors evaluate audit services at the
engagement team and firm level. Sharing this perspective, the current study predicts that
audit service quality attributes, which may lead to audit quality differentiation, will affect
auditor selection in a RFP process in the public sector. The next section develops the
study hypotheses.
3.3.

Development of Hypotheses

3.3.1. Auditor Selection and Perceived Audit Service Qualities
In audit procurement practices, a state audit agency (or a government entity)
issues a request-for-proposal (RFP) to solicit audit services. Interested CPA firms then
submit audit proposal to the audit agency. Product differentiation theory suggests that
auditors, in response to clients' differential demands, will differentiate themselves from
their competitors by highlighting their firm’s unique desirable attributes in their proposals.
Fiolleau et al. (2013) provide direct evidence on audit product differentiation in an RFP
process. They conduct a field study of an audit RFP in a public company; their findings
suggest that factors (e.g., social relationship, organizational fit, proposed fee schedules)
beyond technical expertise differentiated auditors bidding for the audit engagement.
32

Technical qualities refer to traditional views of audit quality, centering on perceptions of auditor
independence and competence. Duff (2009) proposes that service quality and technical quality are both
necessary components of audit quality.
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Therefore, I propose that CPA firms will highlight their perceived audit service quality
attributes, in their proposals, to differentiate themselves from competing bidders.
In the framework of agency theory, public officials are agents of the people, such
as top corporate managers are agents of shareholders. For example, similar to
management in the private sector, elected or appointed government officials are
responsible to manage and operate public resources. Agency problems exist in the public
sector when officials’ interests misalign with the public’s interests. In fact, agency
problems could be more severe in the public sector because taxpayers, unlike
shareholders in the commercial sector, cannot exit relationships with politicians right
away but use their voting rights to monitor government programs and dismiss politicians.
As agency theory suggests, a need to reduce agency costs may induce government
officials to supply monitoring of their actions and performance. Audits of governmental
entities should help control the agency problem with respect to the actions of public
officials (Raman and Wilson 1994). Auditors perceived to provide quality services should
be able to help government clients achieve accountability, improve operations, and instill
confidence among citizens and stakeholders (IIA 2012). Therefore, I hypothesize that
government officials will make their auditor selection decisions based on the evaluation
of the quality attributes reflected in audit proposals.
Based on the audit literature and Duff’s model of audit quality (2004, 2009), I
identify several key service qualities and hypothesize that those attributes have predictive
power in explaining auditor selection in a governmental RFP process. The quality
attributes include independence, competence, marketing relationship (cooperation, trust,
and client satisfaction as discussed in Study 1), firm reputation, team expertise, and
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industry specialization. Independence and marketing relationship are as defined in
Chapter 2 Table 2.1. Competence refers to an auditor’s understanding and knowledge that
enables the auditor to render services with facility and acumen. Firm reputation refers to
the brand name and the standing an auditor enjoys in the market as a reputational
intermediary. As discussed earlier, studies examine auditor expertise at individual level
and firm level. Expertise at the individual level refers to engagement team members’
relevant specialist knowledge and credentials. Expertise at the firm level refers to an audit
firm’s industry focus, which can be captured by sales-based measures (e.g., Palmrose
1986; Mayhew and Wilkins 2002) and/or a number-of-clients-based measure (Balsam et
al. 2003). Although those attributes have potential impacts on audit quality, they are not
audit results but quality elements of audit inputs and processes. In other words, the
present study focuses on perceived audit quality factors, not proxies of actual (realized)
audit quality.
H1: Government clients will choose an auditor whose audit proposal reflects more
perceived audit service qualities, including independence (H1a), relationship-marketing
(H1b), competence (H1c), firm reputation (H1d), team expertise (H1e), and industry
specialization (H1f).
3.3.2. Political Competition
Although authorities recognize the merits of well-designed procurement policies
and each state regulates its procurement process, political scandals (i.e., high-level
officials received kickbacks from private companies awarded government contracts)
illustrate that government officials sometimes hold considerable discretionary powers in
the awarding of contracts. Yet, those discretionary powers may be mitigated by the
degree of political competition in a state. In the U.S., political competition arises when
both of the major parties compete in picking electoral platforms. In contrast, when one
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party has a persistent electoral advantage that arises from a majority of committed voters,
the dominant party faces low competition and thus has less incentive to appeal to swing
marginal voters, who are uncommitted to any party (Besley, Persson, and Sturm 2010).
That is, with higher political competition, incumbent political agents bear greater costs of
breaching the agreements as the chance of losing future elections increases. As public
officials' share of agency costs varies directly with expected political competition, Baber
(1983) suggests that political competition motivates public officials to audit the
disposition of public resources. He argues that in a scenario where interest groups (the
principals) can influence the outcomes of elections, political entrepreneurs (the agents)
advocate policies appealing to voters, and these two parties contract to share benefits
accruing from public service. In such relationships, agency costs will arise when the
agents have incentives to breach the agreements due to conflicts of interest between the
parties. His findings reveal a positive correlation between state audit budgets and
measures of political competition, which indicates that public officials have stronger
incentives to supply auditing when they face higher political competition. That is, the
intensity of political competition in a state can increase officials' demand for a higher
quality audit. Therefore, I hypothesize that a government audit client in a state with
higher political competition is more likely to engage in an effective audit procurement
process. The effectiveness (quality) of an audit procurement process depends on whether
the government client selects an auditor based on an evaluation of perceived quality
attributes reflected in the audit proposals.
H2: Compared to government audit clients in low political competition states, a
government audit client in a high political competition state is more likely to select an
auditor whose audit proposal reflects high quality attributes.
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3.3.3. Perceived Risk of Corruption
As discussed above, the public sector has an agency problem when public
officials put personal utility ahead of the public interest. Political corruption occurs as a
result of the agency problem: public resources are used for the private interests of the
agents instead of the need of the principals (Isaksen 2005). Political corruption, including
embezzlement, nepotism, patronage, etc., refers to the violation of the common interest in
favor of special interests that provide direct or indirect benefit to government officials or
their patrons (Heidenheimer 1970). Motza (1983) and (Tanzi 1998) suggest that the most
serious corruption is related to budgeting and financial management in the budget
processes, including wasteful spending in launching unnecessary and unproductive public
projects and overpaying for services or goods. A recent study also finds an impact of
public officials’ corruption on the size and allocation of U.S. state spending (Liu and
Mikesell 2014). The authors conclude that overall state spending was higher in more
corrupt states than in less corrupt states and that corrupt public officials are likely to
distort states’ public resource allocations in favor of items directly beneficial to
themselves, such as capital, construction, borrowing, total salaries and wages, etc.
Studies also find that public officials’ corruption has a negative impact on public
procurement practices and management of public resources (e.g., Celentani and Ganuza
2001; Hellman et al. 2000; Rose-Ackerman 1997). For example, corrupt officials can
award projects to firms that are not the best quality (i.e., inefficient procurement
decisions) in exchange for a bribe. As political scientists widely recognized the spreading
nature of corruption (e.g., Jain 2001), I propose that corruption can also affect the
effectiveness of the audit procurement process for two reasons. First, due to their self-
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interested motivation to maximize their personal gain, corrupt public officials are likely
to overlook or override procurement policies and simply select an auditor whom they are
friends with or can manipulate and control. Second, auditing provides a monitoring
mechanism, and public sector auditors should objectively assess whether public officials
manage public resources responsibly effectively, and help detect and deter public
corruption (IIA 2012). Therefore, corrupt public officials are less likely to desire a quality
audit than are their less corrupt counterparts. Based on the argument above, I hypothesize
that a government agency is less motivated to support quality audit in a state where the
perceived risk of corruption is high.
H3: Compared to government audit clients in high corruption states, a government audit
client in a low corruption state is more likely to select an auditor whose audit proposal
reflects high quality attributes.
To simplify the model, I assume there is no interaction effect between state
political competition and corruption. The next section discusses the sample and data
collection, the study method, and the measurements of variables used to test the
hypotheses.
3.4.

Data and Method

3.4.1

Sample and Data Collection
The sample is constructed using a set of audit proposals submitted by CPA firms

in a governmental RFP process. See details about the sample and data collection in
Section 2.4.1.
3.4.2.

Linguistic Methods
Similar to Study 1, Study 2 utilizes LIWC to capture and count the occurrences of

the words related to the constructs of interest (i.e., service quality attributes in audit
proposals). The linguistic variables of interest in the current study relate to auditors’
71

independence, relationship marketing, and competence. The first two attributes are
defined in Study 1 Table 2.1; the third attribute is listed in Table 3.1, which provides the
associated definition, the dictionary words, and associated internal reliability statistics.
See discussions about the linguistic methods, dictionary development and validation, and
procedures in Study 1 Section 2.4.2 and Appendix A.
< Insert Table 3.1 here >
3.4.3. Discrete Choice Modeling
This study examines the predictive power of several quality attributes in
explaining auditor selection decisions in audit procurement practices. Government clients
make a choice between two or more CPA firms who submit audit proposals; thus, each
audit proposal represents a discrete choice in its corresponding choice set. Discrete
choice modeling (DCM) attempts to analyze decision maker’s preferences amongst a set
of alternatives (Train 2007). It is widely applied in marketing research to examine
customer choice between products and services. Assuming decision makers to be utility
maximizers, DCM identifies patterns in choices and models how different consumers
respond to competing products. Therefore, a discrete choice model is more appropriate
than a logistic regression model in the analysis of this study.
3.4.3.1. Model 1: Audit Service Quality Attributes and Auditor Selection
Model 1 examines how audit quality attributes in proposals predict auditor choice
in a RFP process (H1). The dependent variable, Winning, is a binary variable indicating
whether an audit proposal is successful (i.e., the CPA firm was selected). Winning equals
1 when an auditor receives a contract for an audit proposal. As there are only two
possible outcomes for a bidding CPA firm ―success or failure― in a RFP process, the
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dependent variable in this study has a Bernoulli distribution, in which n=1 (success)
occurs with probability p and n=0 (failure) occurs with probability q=1- p. In this study, I
modeled the probability of Winning as a function of several independent variables of
interest including include INDP, COM, RM, Top100, ExpYr, and SPEC. The first three
linguistic variables were measured by the percentage of the words related to the word
categories of independence, competence, and relationship marketing (a combination
dictionary of cooperation, trust, and client satisfaction). Top100, an indicator of whether
an audit firm is listed as a Top100 CPA firm by Accounting Today, is a proxy for firm
reputation. Team expertise, ExpYr, is measured as number of years of lead partner’s
auditing experience. SPEC is an indicator for industry specialization.
A proposed firm is considered a specialist in government audits if the firm
reported in the audit proposal that it had audited similar governmental entities and/or
provided a list of numerous audited government clients (i.e., a minimum of 10
government clients in the past 5 years). Controlling variables include predecessor auditor
(Prior), gender of audit engagement partners (Gender), geographic distance between
auditor and client (Distance), and proposed audit fees (Fees). Prior equals to 1 if a
proposed auditor was a predecessor auditor, which is included in the model to control for
the prior relationship between auditor and client. Gender, measured as a percentage of
female audit partners in the engagement, controls for the potential gender effect on
auditor selection. Choi, Kim, Qiu, and Zang (2012) found an association between
geographic proximity and audit quality. Therefore, the geographic distance between
auditor and client was controlled in the selection model as I hypothesized that the
government clients will select an auditor who is perceived to provide quality audit.
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Following prior research (Choi et al. 2012), I measured Distance by taking into account
the actual geographic distance between state auditor offices and the audit engagement
offices. Specifically, I calculated the number of miles between the two locations using the
zip code of the offices. Lastly, I controlled for audit fee and the length of audit proposals
by including the variables, Fees and WC, in the model, which are measured as the natural
logarithm of proposed audit fees and raw number of words in audit proposals. Model 1 is
as listed below:
Winningij ~ Bernoulli (pij), pij ∈ {0, 1}
logit(pij) = β0 + β1*INDPijk + β2*COMijk + β3*RMijk + β4*Top100k + β5*ExpYrijk +
β6*SPECijk + β7*Priorijk + β8*Genderijk +β9* Distanceijk + β10*Feesijk +
β11*WCijk
where for state i, engagement j, and firm k:
Winning = 1 if the proposal is a winning proposal, and 0 otherwise;
INDP = simple count of the words related to the word category of Independence,
divided by the number of words ignoring articles (wc);
COM = simple count of the words related to the word category of Competence,
divided by wc;
RM = simple count of the words related to the word category of Cooperation,
Trust, and Client Satisfaction, divided by wc;
Top100 = 1 if the audit firm is listed as a Top100 CPA firm by Accounting Today,
and 0 otherwise;
ExpYr = number of years of lead audit partner’s auditing experience;
SPEC = 1 if the firm is identified as a specialist in government auditing, and 0
otherwise;
Prior = 1 if the firm is the predecessor auditor, and 0 otherwise;
Gender = % of female partners in the engagement;
Distance = Natural logarithm of geographic distance (in miles) between auditor and
client;
Fees = Natural logarithm of proposed audit fees; and
WC = Natural logarithm of raw number of words per audit proposal.
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3.4.3.2. Model 2 and 3: State’s Political Competition and Corruption Index
Model 2 examines whether the between-state variations in political competition
moderate the ability of the IVs identified in Model 1 to predict auditor choice (H2a). I
adopted Klarner’s (2013) modified Ranney Index 33 and computed the average of the
2000-2010 data as the measurement for each state’s level of political competition (PC).
The modified Ranney measures range from 0.5 to 1; higher values represent higher levels
of competitiveness. PC is entered into Model 2 as a variable interacting with the IV’s of
interest in Model 1. Considering the sample size and the statistical power of the model, I
removed two control variables, Gender and Distance, from Model 2, which were not
significant predictors in Model 1. Model 2 is specified as below.
Winningij ~ Bernoulli (pij), pij ∈ [0, 1]
logit(pij) = β0 + β1*INDPijk + β2*COMijk + β3*RMijk + β4*Top100k + β5*ExpYrijk +
β6*SPECijk + β7*Priorijk + β8*Feesijk +β9*WCijk + β10*PCi + β11*INDPijk*
PCi + β12*COMijk* PCi + β13*RMijk* PCi + β14*Top100k* PCi + β15*ExpYrijk*
PCi + β16*SPECijk* PCi + β17*Priorijk* PCi + β18*Feesijk* PCi
where for state i, engagement j, and firm k:
PC = An average score of the 2000-2010 Modified Ranny index
The definitions of the remaining variables are the same as described in Model 1.
Model 3 examines whether the between-state variations in corruption moderate
the ability of the IVs identified in Model 1 to predict auditor choice (H2b). I measured

33

The original Ranney Index (Ranney 1976) measures a state's competition between the two major political
parties in the United States for the time period of 1962-1973. The modified Ranney Index (Klarner, 2013)
averages four components: proportion of state senators who are Democrats, proportion of state house
members who are Democrats, proportion of the two-party vote that the Democratic candidate got in the last
election, and an indicator for unified party control (0 = unified Republican control, 1 = unified Democratic
control, .5=neither).

75

public corruption (COR) using the Corruption Risk Report Card 34 released by the Center
for Public Integrity (2012). The Center for Public Integrity primarily investigates three
concepts: (1) the existence of public integrity mechanisms that promote public
accountability and limit corruption, (2) the effectiveness of those mechanisms, and (3) the
access that citizens have to those mechanisms. The report card examines the risk of
corruption, not the level of actual corruption, in each state government. That is, a state
with a higher integrity score in the report card has a lower level of perceived risk of
corruption. Similar to Model 2, I interacted the variable COR with the IV’s of Model 1 in
Model 3. Model 3 is specified as below.
Winningij ~ Bernoulli (pij), pij ∈ [0, 1]
logit(pij) = β0 + β1*INDPijk + β2*COMijk + β3*RMijk + β4*Top100k + β5*ExpYrijk +
β6*SPECijk + β7*Priorijk + β8*Feesijk +β9*WCijk + β10*CORi +
β11*INDPijk*CORi + β12*COMijk*CORi + β13*RMijk*CORi +
β14*Top100k*CORi + β15*ExpYrijk*CORi + β16*SPECijk*CORi +
β17*Priorijk*CORi + β18*Feesijk*CORi
where for state i, engagement j, and firm k:
COR = Integrity score per Corruption Risk Report Card
The definitions of the remaining variables are the same as described in Model 1.
3.5. Results
Descriptive statistics and correlations among the variables are presented below,
followed by the main results of hypotheses testing.

34

States were graded on 330 statements about the laws and practices that promote open, accountable state
government and deter corruption. These statements are used as Corruption Risk Indicators, which are
grouped into 14 areas of state government oversight. Overall grades are based on the average grades in the
major areas, and the reporting and research to score the indicators were conducted during the summer 2011.
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3.5.1. Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.2, Panel A reports descriptive statistics on the variables retrieved from the
audit proposals and the interaction variables. The linguistic-based variables are measured
as word percentages (percentage of matched words against the number of all words in a
given proposal). The word categories, Independence (INDP), Competence (COM), and
Relationship Marketing 35 (RM), are constructed to capture auditors’ service quality
attributes in audit proposals. Among these variables, the mean values suggest that CPA
firms more frequently use words related to relationship marketing, followed by
competence and independence, in audit proposals. The lead partners in the proposals have
an average of 22 years working experience in auditing (ExpYr). The mean value of
Gender indicates that there are more male partners than female partners in the proposals.
The percentile measure of geographic distance (Distance) suggests that most of the
proposed CPA firms are located near to clients (i.e., 75% of the firms are within
approximate 100 miles away from clients). The average proposed audit fee is $395,955.
The range of the proposed fees (Fees) is widespread: the lowest proposed fee is about
$12,000 and the highest is about $6.4 million, which suggests high variability in the size
and/or the complexity of the engagements in the sample. The percentile measure further
indicates that the majority of proposed audit fees are relatively small (i.e., 75% of the
sample is below $260,000). In fact, only 24 proposed fees are above $1 million. The
political competition measure (PC) in the study has a mean value of 0.85, which is not
statistically different from that of the 50 states (p=0.62) for the period from 2000 to 2010.
It indicates that the states included in the study do not tend to have higher or lower levels

35

The word category of Relationship Marketing is a combination dictionary of Cooperation, Trust, and
Client Satisfaction as discussed in Study 1.
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of political competition as compared to the out-of -sample states. The state integrity
scores (COR) in the study have an average of 68.52 and range from 52 to 87, which are
comparable to the 50 states’ scores with a mean of 68.22 and a range of 49 to 87.
The normality tests (skewness and kurtosis) indicate that the variables, Distance,
Fees, WC and COR are not normally distributed. For example, the distribution of
Distance is highly skewed (Skewness = 6.247) with heavy tails (Kurtosis = 53.572). In
addition, histograms of the variables, INDP, COM, Distance, Fees, WC, and COR,
indicate outliers at the right end of the distributions. Therefore, before modeling, these
variables are transformed by winsorizing at the 95% percentile and/or by taking natural
logarithms. Panel B reports the transformed data. The skewness and kurtosis values
indicate that the variables are normally distributed after transformation, which are then
used in the subsequent analyses. Panels C and D present the descriptive statistics for the
variables retrieved from the winning and unsuccessful proposals, respectively. The mean
values of the proxies for auditors’ competency (COM and ExpYr) are slightly higher in
the winning proposal group than those in the unsuccessful group. In addition, the mean
value of the proposed audit fee is lower in the winning proposal group. Panels E and F
present the composition of the sample by the existence of a prior relationship between
auditor and client. An auditor is considered a predecessor auditor if the firm had served
the client in the prior year(s) preceding the RFP. Compared to the non-predecessor group,
predecessor auditors seem likely to state less INDP but more RM in their proposals, have
more experiences (higher COM and ExpYr), propose a higher audit fees (higher Fees),
and locate closer to the client (lower Distance). It is consistent with the expectation that a
prior relationship between auditor and client would reduce auditor independence and

78

induce the auditor to emphasize on relationships between the parties. The lower proposed
audit fees for the non-predecessor group suggests that auditors may charge less service
fees (i.e., lowballing) to attract new clients.
< Insert Table 3.2 here >
Table 3.3 reports the correlations among the variables of interest. Winning is
positively correlated with the indicator, Prior, for predecessor auditor. As suggested in
Study 1, Top100 CPA firms are more likely to used words related to the relationship
marketing (RM) attributes in their proposals. In addition, the positive correlations
between Top100 and COM and SPEC indicate that those firms’ proposals emphasize
auditors’ competence and industry specialization. Top100 also positively correlated with
proposed audit fees (Fees), which is consistent with the literature in price premium in the
audit market. The correlation results between PC and COR are mixed. Spearman
correlation matrix indicates a positive association between these two variables,
suggesting that a state with a higher political competition is perceived to be less corrupted.
However, this positive association is not significant in the Pearson correlation matrix. I
further ran statistical tests to examine multicollinearity of the variables. Collinearity
diagnostics indicate that there is no multicollinearity among the IVs of INDP, COM, RM,
ExpYr, Top100, Prior, SPEC, Fees, WC, PC, and COR (i.e., VIF<2.5 in all tests).
< Insert Table 3.3 here >
3.5.2. Test of Hypotheses
H1 predicts that government clients will choose an auditor whose audit proposal
reflects more perceived audit service qualities. By fitting a discrete choice model to the
dataset of auditor choices, I examined whether the following features have predictive
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powers in explaining the auditor selection decision: independence (H1a), relationshipmarketing attributes (H1b), competence (H1c), firm reputation (H1d), team expertise
(H1e), and industry specialization (H1f). Table 3.4 reports the results of three discrete
choice models. In Column (1), the sample size is 288, which includes the data points that
have proposed audit fee information 36. Model 1a reports a significant result for
competence (COM: coefficient = .957; p = .034), which suggests that a CPA firm is more
likely to be selected if its audit proposal states more competence. Therefore, H1c is
supported. However, as the remaining variables of interest are not significant, H1a, H1b,
H1d, H1e, and H1f are not supported. Besides, the result for Prior is significant, which
suggests that government clients are more likely to select a predecessor auditor if not
prohibited by policies. The Hosmer-Lemeshow test, a statistical test for goodness of fit
for logistic regression models, indicates that Model 1a has adequate fit and is correctly
specified (p=.182). In addition, Nagelkerke’s Pseudo R2 suggests that the model explains
roughly 16.5% of the variation in the outcome.
Forty-four data points were removed from Model 1a due to missing fee data. The
fee information is not available because in some states a cost proposal is not opened
when a CPA firm’s technique proposal fails to pass the evaluation criteria and thus is
disqualified from further evaluation. As Fees is not a significant predictor in Model 1a, I
removed it from Model 1b and included the 44 data points for an analysis. As reported in
Column (2), the sample size increased to 332 (288+44), and the results are consistent
with those of Model 1a. Column (3) reported the results with imputed fee data. Multiple
Imputation (MI) is a statistical technique that replaces each missing value with a set of

36

See Sample Characteristics in Table 2.4.
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plausible values that represent the uncertainty about the right value to impute (Rubin
1987). Assuming the missing values are missing at random, I utilized MI to generate
imputed data for the missing fee values, and the results of the five stimulated complete
datasets are combined to produce pooled estimates as reported for Model 1c. The pooled
results are consistent with those of Model 1a and 1b, except that Fees become significant
in the imputed model.
< Insert Table 3.4 here >
H2 hypothesizes that a higher level of political competition in a state will increase
a government client’s need for quality audit in that state. The prediction is that the
coefficients of the interaction terms (e.g., PC*quality attribute) will be significantly
positive. However, Model 2a in Table 3.5 reports no significant results for the interaction
terms, which suggest that variations in the levels of the states’ political competition do
not affect the effect of perceived audit service qualities on auditor selection decisions.
Like Model 1b, Model 2b in Column (2) using the 332 data points reports the results
consistent with those of Model 2a. The imputed datasets also report non-significant
results (untabulated). Therefore, H2a is not supported. The Hosmer-Lemeshow test of
goodness of fit indicates that Model 2a (b) has adequate fit (p>0.05). In addition,
Nagelkerke’s Pseudo R2 suggests that the model explains roughly 21.3% (19.9%) of the
variation in the outcome.
H3 hypothesizes that a client in a state with a lower perceived corruption risk will
be more likely to demand a high quality audit. The prediction is that the coefficients of
the interaction terms (e.g., COR*quality attribute) will be significantly positive. However,
Model 3a (n=288) and 3b (n=322) in Table 3.5 reports no significant results for all of the
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interaction terms, except for COR*Prior (coefficient = -.169, p=.037; coefficient = -.216,
p=.004). The negative coefficient indicates that government clients who are in a state
with a lower level of perceived corruption risk are less likely to select a predecessor
auditor, compared to those in the states with a higher level of perceived corruption risk.
The overall results suggest that variations in the levels of the states’ perceived corruption
risk do not affect the effect of perceived audit service qualities on auditor selection
decisions. The imputed datasets also report consistent results (untabulated). Therefore,
H3 is not supported. The Hosmer-Lemeshow test of goodness of fit indicates that Model
3 has adequate fit (p>.05). In addition, Nagelkerke’s Pseudo R2 suggests that the model
explains roughly 21.4% (21.3%) of the variation in the outcome.
3.5.3. Supplemental Analysis
To address the potential issues associated with the nested structure of the proposal
dataset, I ran generalized linear mixed models to test the study hypotheses. After
controlling for the random effects of Engagement within State, State, and CPA firm, the
mixed models report similar results as discrete choice models 37. In Table 3.6 Panel A, the
results for Model 1 indicate that auditor competence (COM: coefficient=0.17; p=0.04)
and preexisting client-auditor relationships (Prior: coefficient=0.30; p<0.01) predict
auditor selection decisions. Likewise, Model 2 in Table 3.6 Panel A reports no significant
results for the interaction terms of political competition and perceived audit service
qualities. Lastly, the results for Model 3 reported in Table 3.6 Panel A are similar to those
reported by the discrete choice modeling: the interaction term, COR*Prior, also has a
significant negative coefficient value. As discussed in Chapter 2, Panel B in Table 3.6

37

I ran mixed effect models for both samples (n=288 and 332). The results for both samples are similar; the
numbers reported in Table 3.6 are based on the sample of 332.
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reports the parameter estimated for the random effects in the linear mixed models. The
estimated parameters reported here indicate that both FirmRC and StateRC account for
the variance of the random effects, but not significantly.
Due to the small sample size and numerous predictors in the models, I used
G*Power to estimate the archived power with a post hoc analysis. Based on an omnibus
multiple regression power analysis, the statistical power of the models is adequate
(>90%), given input parameters of a medium effect size, an alpha value of 0.05, a total
sample size of 288, and 18 predictors.
3.6.

Discussion, Limitations, and Summary
This study examines audit proposals to reveal whether audit service quality

attributes signaled in audit proposals explain government clients' selection of auditor. The
results suggest that auditor competence predicts auditor selection in a government RFP
process when the signals are embedded in the text of audit proposals (i.e., linguistic
descriptions of auditor competence). There are no significant results for the measures of
auditor competence in terms of the number of years of lead partners’ working experience
in auditing and the number of government clients of an audit firm. The linguistic
literature provides a possible explanation for the predictive power of the linguistic-based
measure observed in this study. For example, Berry, Hiller, Mueller and Pennebaker
(1997) examine the effect of individuals’ verbalizations on social perception 38 of others.
Specifically, they use LIWC to investigate the relations between individual differences in
word selection and first impressions. They find that the language dimensions account for
significant proportions of the variance in impressions of the individuals beyond that
explained by nonlinguistic predictors (i.e., nonverbal expressiveness). Consistent with
38

Refers to how people form impression of and make inferences about other people.

83

previous work on person perception (e.g., Feingold 1992), their findings indicate the
linguistic dimensions are significant predictors of perceived competence. Moreover,
some practitioners believe that words matter as much as numbers or even more in
business because the words a company shares can fully express its underlying beliefs and
cultures (e.g., Rittenhouse 2013; Williams 2013). To sum up, the linguistic category of
auditor competence are likely to influence clients’ impressions of a firm and further
affect their auditor selection decisions.
The study also finds that government audit clients are more likely to hire a
predecessor auditor, which suggests that they desire to have a long-term relationship with
the auditor. This tendency may explain a non-significant result for auditor independence
as studies generally suggest that ongoing auditor-client relationships make it difficult for
auditors to maintain the appropriate level of independence (e.g., Church et al. 2015).
Although the current study does not provide a conclusive finding on proposed audit fees
(i.e., not significant in the original model but become significant in the imputed model),
the negative coefficients in both models suggest that government audit clients would
select a lower bidder. Lastly, there are no results indicating whether political competition
and perceived risk of corruption would affect audit procurement quality in the public
sector. A possible reason for the non-significant results is that both political competition
and perceived risk of corruption are measured at a higher, broader level (i.e., statewide
scope) and thus may not directly influence officials’ decision-making at a lower level, i.e.,
in their choices of auditors.
In addition to the limitations of the linguistic approach discussed in Chapter 2,
two caveats should be considered when evaluating the reported findings. First, the present
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study does not measure audit clients’ perceptions of auditors’ service qualities based on
their readings of audit proposals. In other words, there is no direct evidence that higher
frequency of words related to a certain attribute is associated with (or cause) higher client
perceptions of that attribute of an auditor. Therefore, the study cannot address the issue of
causality between perceived audit service qualities and auditor selection decisions.
Second, the study measures firm reputation with a dichotomized variable (i.e., whether a
firm is recognized as a Top100 CPA firm or not), which likely results in information loss
(Shinkins 2013). One can argue that the Big N audit firms are much more reputable than
the rest of the Top100 CPA firms, and those non-Big N-Top100 CPA firms are not
necessarily enjoy more reputation than non-Top100 CPA firms. Another measurement
issues are related to the measure of perceived risk of corruption, which is calculated
based on various components that may not be completely relevant to the audit
procurement practices in question (e.g., state insurance commissions, lobbying disclosure,
redistricting process, civil service management). The use of the imprecise measure may
lead to unreliable estimates of the effect of corruption on audit procurement quality.
To conclude, this study uses a textual analysis program, LIWC, to examine the
associations between the linguistic cues related to perceived audit service attributes in
audit proposals and governmental clients’ auditor selection decision. The study
contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, the study results show a positive
relation between a linguistic-based measure of auditor competence and auditor choice.
This is consistent with a proposition that procurement practices in the public sector
should inform a governmental client in selecting a competent supplier (Raman and
Wilson 1994). Second, the results indicate that a prior client-auditor relationship is likely
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to affect auditor selection outcome. Regulators should weigh the benefit of a close clientauditor relationship (i.e., familiarity) against the related cost (i.e., loss in objectivity) in
considering the need for mandatory auditor rotation. Lastly, the current study contributes
by extending our understanding of the nature of an auditor proposal and its role in
governmental audit procurement practices.
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Table 3.1: Constructed Word Categories and Validity Statistics
Category
(Abbreviation)

Competence
(COM)

Definition (Source)

“...is derived from a
synthesis of education and
experience."
"Attainment and
maintenance of a level of
understanding and
knowledge that enables a
member to render services
with facility and acumen.”
(AICPA ET section 56
Article V)

List of words*

ability; able; appropriate;
appropriateness; capability;
capable; capacity; certificate;
certification; certified;
competence; competency;
competent; educated;
education; educational;
experience; experienced;
expert; expertise;
familiar; familiarity;
knowledge; knowledgeable;
license; licensed; profession;
professional; proficiency;
proficient; qualification;
qualified; qualify; skill;
skilled; skillful; specialist;
specialize; specialty;
sufficient; superior; train;
trained; training.

Alpha
(Binary/
raw)**

0.765/
0.435

* See the development of the word lists in Appendix A.
** As suggested by the LIWC2007 Manual, the alpha reliability is calculated based on the binary and
uncorrected methods. The binary method converts the usage of each of the single words within a given text
into either a 0 (not used) or a 1 (used one or more times). The uncorrected method is based on the
percentage of total words that each of the category words is used.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics
Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

25th

50th

75th

Skew

Kurtosis

Panel A: Entire Sample (N=288)
INDP

.167

.099

.000

.500

.090

.160

.230

.590

.321

COM

1.402

.407

.610

3.170

1.123

1.370

1.650

.566

.898

RM

2.221

.831

.610

4.560

1.490

2.115

2.800

.527

-.339

22.420

7.598

3.000

44.000

16.000

20.000

29.000

.416

-.198

.258

.301

.000

1.000

.000

.000

.500

.774

-.318

84.365

152.647

1.000

1667.000

5.500

45.550

106.000

6.247

53.572

Fees

$395,955

903,048

12,450

6,437,721

50,550

105,443

258,375

3.914

16.308

WC

6,795

5,655

654

37,664

3,794

5,617

7,353

3.197

12.359

PC

.854

.037

.760

.930

.820

.860

.860

-.191

.922

68.531

5.324

52.000

87.000

66.000

67.000

74.000

.321

2.449

ExpYr
Gender
Distance

COR

Panel B: Transformation
INDP_W

.163

.091

.000

.340

.090

.160

.230

.182

-.770

COM_W

1.390

.376

.610

2.110

1.123

1.370

1.650

.080

-.654

Dist_ln

69.747

74.960

1.000

231.200

5.500

45.550

106.000

.966

-.427

Fees_ln

11.766

1.328

9.429

15.678

10.831

11.566

12.462

.791

.466

WC_Wln

8.587

.607

6.483

9.852

8.241

8.633

8.903

-.405

1.097

COR_W

68.281

4.693

52.000

75.000

66.000

67.000

74.000

-.599

.854

Panel C: Winning Proposal Sample (N=82)
INDP
COM
RM
ExpYr
Gender
Distance
Fees
WC

.159
1.468
2.165
23.280
.260
80.794
$378,632
7,273

.102
.407
.866
8.079
.313
98.219
882,776
6,922

.000
.620
.950
10.000
.000
1.000
12,450
1,146

.430
3.170
4.560
44.000
1.000
548.000
4,579,000
37,664

.078
1.208
1.475
17.750
.000
5.800
39,750
3,858

.150
1.385
2.000
22.500
.000
47.550
88,538
5,124

.240
1.658
2.733
29.000
.500
112.000
275,784
7,611

.504
1.096
.830
.464
.844
2.139
3.647
3.010

-.266
2.896
.356
-.174
-.222
6.478
12.874
9.436

Panel D: Unsuccessful Proposal Sample (N=206)
INDP
.170
COM
1.376
RM
2.243
ExpYr
22.078
Gender
.257
Distance
85.787
Fees
$402,851
WC
6,605

.097
.405
.817
7.391
.297
169.713
913,023
5,071

.000
.610
.610
3.000
.000
1.000
14,400
654

.500
2.760
4.230
44.000
1.000
1667.000
6,437,721
37,119

88

.100
1.070
1.505
16.000
.000
5.250
54,900
3,772

.160
1.355
2.190
20.000
.000
44.100
115,615
5,684

.230
.646
.618
1.658
.370
.012
2.838
.401
-.596
29.000
.372
-.256
.500
.746
-.350
101.500 6.203 48.649
254,794 4.032 17.779
7,143 3.149 13.389

Table 3.2 (continued)
Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

25th

50th

75th

Skew

Kurtosis

Panel E: Predecessor Auditor Sample (N=62)
INDP
COM
RM
ExpYr
Gender
Distance
Fees
WC

.151
1.454
2.232
23.048
.274
70.908
447,457
6,718

.099
.459
.885
7.867
.343
81.176
844,036
6,059

.000
.670
.610
10.000
.000
1.000
12,450
654

.430
3.170
4.510
40.000
1.000
244.000
4,579,000
32,317

.070
1.158
1.565
17.750
.000
3.300
57,550
3,429

.145
1.425
2.105
21.500
.000
34.150
162,963
5,256

.210
1.703
2.823
28.250
.500
118.500
373,888
6,891

.774
1.048
.557
.345
.919
.910
3.460
2.595

.144
2.246
-.081
-.653
-.296
-.726
12.616
7.418

Panel F: Non-Predecessor Auditor Sample (N=226)
INDP
.171
.098
.000
.500
.100
.160
.240
.553
.440
COM
1.388
.391
.610
2.760
1.115
1.360
1.640
.323
.024
RM
2.218
.817
.800
4.560
1.458
2.125
2.800
.518
-.421
ExpYr
22.248
7.532
3.000
44.000
16.000
20.000
29.000
.436
-.036
Gender
.253
.289
.000
1.000
.000
.000
.500
.692
-.436
Distance
88.057 166.948
1.000 1667.000
5.725
50.050 105.250 6.024 47.140
Fees
381,826 919,859
14,400 6,437,721
48,844
97,663 224,588 4.033 17.270
6,816
5,553
795
37,664
3,878
5,624
7,523 3.425 14.412
WC
Variable Definitions:
Winning = 1 if the auditor is awarded with a contract, and 0 otherwise;
INDP = Self-constructed category of independence. Simple count divided by the number of words
ignoring articles (%), winsorizing at 95%;
COM = Self-constructed category of competence. Simple count divided by the number of words
ignoring articles (%);
RM = Self-constructed category of relationship marketing attributes (cooperation, trust, and
client satisfaction). Simple count divided by the number of words ignoring articles (%);
ExpYr = Number of years of lead partner’s working experience in auditing;
Gender = % of female partners in the engagement;
Distance = Distance (in miles) between the offices of state auditor and CPA firm;
Fees = Proposed audit fees retrieved from proposal;
WC = Raw number of words per audit proposal
PC = 2000-2010 average Ranney measures of political competitiveness
COR = State integrity scores
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Table 3.3: Cross-Correlation Matrixa

Winning

Winning
1.000

INDP
-0.052

COM
0.084

RM
-0.059

ExpYr
0.020

Top100
-0.059

Prior
.311**

SPEC
0.018

Fees
-0.084

Distance
0.037

Gender
0.018

PC
0.021

COR
0.103

WC
0.010

INDP

-0.051

1.000

-.214**

.224**

0.016

-0.013

-0.074

-0.066

-0.012

-.178**

-0.101

-.120*

-.213**

.131*

COM

0.089

-.204**

1.000

.259**

-0.070

.132*

0.034

0.014

-.143*

0.002

.114*

.425**

.117*

-.339**

RM

-0.037

.189**

.271**

1.000

-0.062

.543**

0.010

.260**

-0.080

-.421**

0.041

.209**

-.127*

-.127*

ExpYr

0.038

0.019

-0.071

-0.082

1.000

-0.016

0.010

.135*

-0.077

0.000

**

**

*

.518

**

-0.031

1.000

-0.011

.430

1.000

0.037

-0.079

0.007

-0.014

-0.005

**

0.008

.195

**

**

.233**

0.114

-0.038

0.009

.139*

.190**

-0.029

*

-0.043

0.005

0.040

.233**

Top100

-0.059

-0.016

.123

Prior

.311**

-0.064

0.038

0.013

0.022

-0.011

**

*

**

0.037

1.000

-0.030

-.137

.183
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0.018

-0.079

0.009

.228

Fees

-0.068

0.028

-.156**

-0.091

-0.091

.199**

0.095

-0.026

1.000

0.089

-0.012

-0.012

.241**

.332**

Distance

0.036

-.197**

0.070

-.331**

-0.052

-.166**

-0.001

-0.101

.137*

1.000

.120*

-.137*

.195**

0.002

0.022

*

0.099

0.042

1.000

*

0.027

-0.036

**

**

-0.020

0.089

0.083

-0.036

-0.103

-0.095

-.146

1.000

.330

**

-.332**

-.148**

-0.033

0.072

.169**

-0.083

.302**

.239**

0.021

.128*

1.000

0.017

-0.002

**

-0.046

**

**

0.003

1.000

-.115

PC

0.006

-0.082

.383

COR

0.097

-.135*

0.070

0.035

*

WC

.111

a

-.331

**

.156

-0.090

-0.087

.430

-.279

SPEC

Gender

.133

.160

-0.028

.271

0.033

-0.081

.226

-0.046

.359

.197

**

0.031

**

-0.027

-.140

-.311

**

This table provides correlations among the variables used in subsequent tests. Spearman (Pearson) correlations are above (below) the diagonal.
**,* Indicate two-tailed significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively.
Variable Definitions:
Winning = 1 if client management helps to select the auditor, and 0 otherwise;
INDP = Self-constructed category of independence. Simple count divided by the number of words ignoring articles (%).The data is
transformed by winsorizing at the 95% percentile.
COM = Self-constructed category of competence. Simple count divided by the number of words ignoring articles (%).The data is
transformed by winsorizing at the 95% percentile.
RM = Self-constructed category of relationship marketing attributes (cooperation, trust, and client satisfaction). Simple count divided by
the number of words ignoring articles (%).
ExpYr = Number of years of lead partner’s working experience in auditing.

Table 3.3 (Continued)

Variable Definitions (continued):
Top100 = 1 if the audit firm is listed as a Top100 CPA firm by Accounting Today, and 0 otherwise.
Prior = 1 if the firm is the predecessor auditor, and 0 otherwise.
SPEC = 1 if the firm is identified as a specialist in government auditing, and 0 otherwise.
Fees = Natural logarithm of proposed audit fees;
Distance = Distance (in miles) between the offices of state auditor and CPA firm. The data is transformed by winsorizing at the 95% percentile.
Gender = Percentage of female partners in the engagement;
PC = 2000-2010 average Ranney measures of political competitiveness
COR = State integrity scores. The data is transformed by winsorizing at the 95% percentile.
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Table 3.4: Perceived Service Qualities and Auditor Selection Decision
Column

(1)

(2)

(3)

N = 288

N= 332

N =332 MI

Model 1a

Model 1b

Model 1c

Parameter

β

p-value

β

Intercept
INDP
COM
RM
ExpYr
Top100
Prior
SPEC
Fees
Distance
Gender
WC

-4.620
0.109
0.957
-0.049
0.014
-0.652
1.539
0.234
-0.204
0.000
-0.001
0.636

.138
.951
.034
.834
.447
.114
.000
.479
.101
.931
.912
.032

-7.222
-.307
.940
-.038
.011
-.596
1.635
.146

.006
.844
.029
.870
.558
.113
.000
.648

.000
.001
.525

.971
.898
.047

p-value

β

p-value

-4.934
.010
.919
-.091
.009
-.423
1.772
.067
-.337
.001
-.001
.727

.082
.995
.037
.692
.631
.274
.000
.837
.004
.786
.895
.011

R Square

0.165

0.159

-

Classification

75.0

78.0

-

Variable Definitions:
INDP
COM
RM
ExpYr
Top100
Prior
SPEC
Fees
Distance
Gender
WC

= Self-constructed category of independence. Simple count divided by the number of words
ignoring articles (%). The data is transformed by winsorizing at the 95% percentile.
= Self-constructed category of competence. Simple count divided by the number of words
ignoring articles (%).The data is transformed by winsorizing at the 95% percentile.
= Self-constructed category of relationship marketing attributes (cooperation, trust, and
client satisfaction). Simple count divided by the number of words ignoring articles (%).
= Number of years of lead partner’s working experience in auditing.
= 1 if the audit firm is listed as a Top100 CPA firm by Accounting Today, and 0 otherwise.
= 1 if the firm is the predecessor auditor, and 0 otherwise.
= 1 if the firm is identified as a specialist in government auditing, and 0 otherwise.
= Natural logarithm of proposed audit fees.
= Distance (in miles) between the offices of state auditor and CPA firm. The data is
transformed by winsorizing at the 95% percentile.
= % of female partners in the engagement.
= Natural logarithm of raw number of words per audit proposal.
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Table 3.5: State Political Competition, Corruption Risk, and Audit Procurement Quality
Column

(1)
N = 288
Model 2a

(2)
N= 332
Model 2b

(3)
N = 288
Model 3a

(4)
N= 332
Model 3b

Parameter

β

p-value

β

p-value

β

p-value

Intercept

-109.65

.029

-55.51

0.02

25.51

0.30

10.67

0.39

INDP

24.98

.577

55.34

0.17

9.71

0.72

13.12

0.51

COM

28.26

.058

24.15

0.08

-4.75

0.45

-3.60

0.52

RM

6.57

.402

2.86

0.68

-6.34

0.14

-6.48

0.07

ExpYr

0.24

.645

0.20

0.70

-0.19

0.52

-0.36

0.17

Top100

-10.13

.405

-5.87

0.56

-1.65

0.76

0.74

0.86

Prior

-6.70

.431

-7.44

0.37

13.39

0.02

16.65

0.00

SPEC

15.98

.080

11.82

0.18

6.57

0.19

4.34

0.29

Fees

3.41

.279

-1.33

0.41

WC

0.64

.058

0.45

0.12

0.68

0.03

0.59

0.04

PC

121.76

.037

57.43

0.04

PC by INDP

-29.46

.573

-65.42

0.16

PC by COM

-31.99

.066

-27.12

0.10

PC by RM

-7.64

.400

-3.34

0.68

PC by ExpYr

-.27

.664

-0.22

0.71

PC by Top100

10.89

.443

6.20

0.60

PC by Prior

9.66

.329

10.72

0.26

PC by SPEC

-18.54

.085

-13.84

0.18

PC by Fees

-4.23

.255

COR

-0.46

0.19

-0.26

0.12

COR by INDP
COR by COM
COR by RM
COR by ExpYr
COR by
Top100
COR by Prior
COR by SPEC
COR by Fees
R Square
Classification

-0.15
0.084
0.09
0.00

0.69
0.35
0.14
0.48

-0.21
0.06
0.10
0.01

0.46
0.43
0.07
0.15

0.02

0.85

-0.02

0.74

-0.17
-0.09
0.02

0.04
0.20
0.48

-0.22
-0.06

0.00
0.32

0.21
74.3

0.20
77.7
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0.21
75.7

β

p-value

.21
75.7

Table 3.5 (Continued)
Variable Definitions:
INDP
COM
RM
ExpYr
Top100
Prior
SPEC
Fees
Distance
Gender
WC
PC
COR

= Self-constructed category of independence. Simple count divided by the number of words
ignoring articles (%). The data is transformed by winsorizing at the 95% percentile.
= Self-constructed category of competence. Simple count divided by the number of words
ignoring articles (%).The data is transformed by winsorizing at the 95% percentile.
= Self-constructed category of relationship marketing attributes (cooperation, trust, and client
satisfaction). Simple count divided by the number of words ignoring articles (%).
= Number of years of lead partner’s working experience in auditing.
= 1 if the audit firm is listed as a Top100 CPA firm by Accounting Today, and 0 otherwise.
= 1 if the firm is the predecessor auditor, and 0 otherwise.
= 1 if the firm is identified as a specialist in government auditing, and 0 otherwise.
= Natural logarithm of proposed audit fees.
= Distance (in miles) between the offices of state auditor and CPA firm. The data is
transformed by winsorizing at the 95% percentile.
= % of female partners in the engagement.
= Natural logarithm of raw number of words per audit proposal.
= 2000-2010 average modified Ranney measures of political competitiveness; and
= State integrity score winsorized at 95%.
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Table 3.6: Results From Linear Mixed Effect Models
Panel A: Estimates of Fixed Effects
Column

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Parameter

β

p-value

β

p-value

β

p-value

Intercept

-0.44

0.42

-18.61

0.04

4.67

0.33

INDP

0.01

0.97

4.71

0.49

1.21

0.80

COM

0.17

0.04

4.98

0.05

-1.05

0.34

RM

0.00

0.99

1.23

0.36

-1.01

0.18

ExpYr

0.00

0.34

0.06

0.53

-0.03

0.58

Top100

-0.11

0.18

-1.56

0.46

-0.41

0.67

Prior

0.30

0.00

-1.14

0.45

2.27

0.02

SPEC

0.04

0.54

2.14

0.15

0.98

0.29

Fees

-0.04

0.12

0.55

0.32

-0.14

0.62

Distance

0.00

0.92

Gender

0.00

0.90

WC

0.10

0.07

0.09

0.11

0.10

0.08

PC

21.27

0.04

PC by INDP

-5.51

0.49

PC by COM

-5.62

0.06

PC by RM

-1.41

0.36

PC by ExpYr

-0.06

0.55

PC by Top100

1.66

0.50

PC by Prior

1.70

0.33

PC by SPEC

-2.45

0.16

PC by Fees

-0.69

0.29
-0.07
-0.02
0.02
0.01
0.00

0.28
0.78
0.26
0.18
0.52

0.00
-0.03
-0.01
0.00

0.74
0.05
0.30
0.72

COR
COR by INDP
COR by COM
COR by RM
COR by ExpYr
COR by
Top100
COR by Prior
COR by SPEC
COR by Fees

95

Table 3.6 (Continued)
Panel B: Estimates of Covariance Parameters
Model 1
Residual
0.175
EngRC(StateRC)
0.000
StateRC
0.005
FirmRC
0.009

Model 2
0.178
0.000
0.008
0.003

Model 3
0.173
0.000
0.007
0.008

Variable Definitions:
INDP

COM
RM
ExpYr
Top100
Prior
SPEC
Fees
Distance
Gender
WC
PC
COR

= Self-constructed category of independence. Simple count divided by the number of
words ignoring articles (%). The data is transformed by winsorizing at the 95%
percentile.
= Self-constructed category of competence. Simple count divided by the number of words
ignoring articles (%).The data is transformed by winsorizing at the 95% percentile.
= Self-constructed category of relationship marketing attributes (cooperation, trust, and
client satisfaction). Simple count divided by the number of words ignoring articles (%).
= Number of years of lead partner’s working experience in auditing.
= 1 if the audit firm is listed as a Top100 CPA firm by Accounting Today, and 0
otherwise.
= 1 if the firm is the predecessor auditor, and 0 otherwise.
= 1 if the firm is identified as a specialist in government auditing, and 0 otherwise.
= Natural logarithm of proposed audit fees.
= Distance (in miles) between the offices of state auditor and CPA firm. The data is
transformed by winsorizing at the 95% percentile.
= % of female partners in the engagement.
= Natural logarithm of raw number of words per audit proposal.
= 2000-2010 average modified Ranney measures of political competitiveness; and
= State integrity score winsorized at 95%.
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Chapter 4: Conclusion
Although procurements for audit services are common in the public sector, we
know little about how audit firms communicate with prospective clients in a RFP process
and on what basis government clients select auditors for audit services. This dissertation
consists of two studies investigating audit proposals submitted for government audit
engagements. The first study examines CPA firms’ impression management strategies
that can exemplify a firm’s commercial and/or professional values. In the past decades,
intensified competition in audit markets induces increasing awareness of
commercialization (Humphrey and Moizer 1990) and results in adoption of relationship
marketing-oriented strategies (Reid 2008). Researchers indicate that commercialization
carried out by marketing activities has become a norm in professional service firms. For
example, Broberg et al. (2013) find that auditors view marketing activities as an integral
part of the auditing profession and build their competitive advantage on those activities
(Hodges and Young 2009). Many have raised a concern about the development of
commercialization (i.e., focusing on profitability and service to clients) as opposed to
professionalism in the audit industry (e.g., Sweeney and Pierce 2004; Sweeney and
McGarry 2011). In fact, some view auditors’ promotion on value-added audit services
and close working relationships with clients as a possible preclusion of auditor
independence (Beattie et al. 2000). Therefore, it is important to understand how a firm’s
marketing materials relate to their professional values and whether the firm’s commercial
image potentially conflicts with audit independence.
The findings of the first study indicate that auditors use marketing language to
impress their prospective clients. Specifically, CPA firms, especially the larger ones, are
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likely to project a persona of a cooperative and trustworthy service provider, instead of an
independent auditor, in audit proposals. The result resonates with the argument of
Suddaby, Gendron, and Lam (2009) that competitive market conditions and
organizational pressure may lead audit firms to emphasize commercial gain but discount
ethical and independent values. Achieving a proper balance between professional and
commercial interests is a challenge for both regulators and practitioners (e.g., Suddaby et
al. 2009; Fiolleau et al. 2013). An over-emphasis on auditors’ commercial interests would
reduce audit quality (e. g., Gendron 2002; Tackett, Wolf, and Claypool 2004; PCAOB
2013). Responding to the PCAOB’s concern about a firm’s marketing materials, this
study provides evidence of auditors’ commercial personae embodied in audit proposals.
The findings imply that commercial considerations can drive CPA firms’ impression
management and may jeopardize the perceived independence of CPA firms in a
contracting process. The study has important policy and practice implications because the
regulators and practitioners may need to reconsider and reevaluate what level and kind of
marketing activities are appropriate for “independent” auditors.
The second study of the dissertation discusses audit procurement practices and
investigates the procurement quality in the public sector. The quality of government
audits should be of interest to stakeholders including political interest groups and
taxpayers because auditing provides a control function in monitoring public sector
entities (e.g., Bendor 1990; Deis and Giroux 1994). Researchers provide empirical
evidence that auditing plays an essential role in enhancing efficiency in the use of public
resources, such as optimal resource allocation in government operations (Saito and
Mcintosh 2010). As audit procurement practices are deemed as a mechanism for ensuring
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audit quality (GAO 1986; AICPA 1987), it is important to understand whether auditor
selection decisions are made depending on auditors’ perceived audit service qualities as
recommended by regulators. For example, the GFOA suggests that in an audit
procurement process, “the principal factor in the selection of an independent auditor is
the auditor’s ability to perform a quality audit” and that “in no case should price be
allowed to serve as the sole criterion for selection of an independent auditor” (GFOA
2002 p. 2).
This study finds that auditors who evidence competence and qualification in their
proposals are more likely to be selected in a RFP process. However, I do not find
significant results for other perceived audit service qualities including independence,
relationship marketing, firm reputation, team expertise, and industry specialization. On
the other hand, the result suggests that a preexisting relationship between auditors and
clients predicts auditor selection. Although I cannot comment on the ultimate level of
audit quality provided by the selected auditors in my sample, the study results support
Fiolleau’s et al. (2013) suggestion of a market demand for auditor attributes other than
independence. Research suggests that political competition and corruption would affect
public officials’ behavior and decisions in public resource management (e.g., budgeting,
spending); however, this study does not find the impact of these political environment
factors on audit procurement quality.
4.1.

Limitations
Several inherent limitations of a word counting approach have been discussed in

the early chapters. Language is highly contextual, and a word count program, like LIWC,
may fail to capture different context and thus misclassify some words. However, this
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issue could be inconsequential as Berry et al. (1997) suggest that the number of
misclassifications in LIWC should be small compared with the number of correct
classifications. Another major limitation relates to the dataset of audit proposals. Because
the proposals obtained were submitted for government audit engagements in 15 U.S.
states, the generalizability of the study results may be limited. Lastly, although audit
proposals is a key element in a RFP process, other factors (e.g., personal or professional
relationships between the parties) may affect a client’s auditor choice. Future research
can collect information on those ex-ante connections and factor them into the auditor
selection model.
4.2.

Contributions
This paper contributes to auditing research in several ways. First, to my

knowledge, the dataset of audit proposals is new and unexplored in research. Audit
proposals are the key element in a RFP process; this unique data set facilitates our
understanding of how CPA firms market their services through impression management.
The findings expand the auditing literature investigating auditors' relationship marketing
strategies. Second, this study employs emerging corpus linguistic methods to analyze the
audit proposals and reveals the promises made by auditors to their public sector audit
clients. This paper is among the first to create and validate word categories that capture
these critical messages communicated through audit proposals. Third, the first study
responds to the PCAOB's call for attention to CPA firms' commercial considerations that
may influence audit performance. The results provides insights on how audit firms’
impression management, when driven by their commercial interests, can be a potential
threat to auditor independence in appearance. This type of the threat has not yet been
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widely recognized by the literature or regulations. Although the results are from public
audits data, we would expect to see auditors engage in more relationship marketing
strategies in the private sector where auditors’ commercial interests prevail. Lastly, the
second study expands the auditing literature in perceived audit service qualities. To date,
research generally surveys audit clients' to assess their perceptions of audit quality
attributes. This study directly assesses the links of perceived audit quality attributes at
both the firm and individual level to clients' auditor selections. The findings on the power
of the language in marketing materials provide implications for practitioners and
regulators. Practicing auditors can emphasize their competitive advantages using
convincing language but should be also mindful about their marketing language that may
leave an impression not intended by the firms. Audit quality has multiple dimensions, and
the trade-off among desirable audit attributes has been a difficult issue for regulators
(Fiolleau et al. 2013). Regulators should consider ways to constraint or monitor audit
firms’ intensive marketing activities, which have the potential to impair auditors’
independence in fact and/or in appearance.
4.3.

Future Research
The current study examines how CPA firms compose audit proposals as an

impression management tool. As the audiences of audit proposals are potential audit
clients, CPA firms may create an image with attributes preferred by clients, but not by the
public. Future research could investigate other marketing tools (e.g., media, websites, and
newsletters) that CPA firms use to communicate with the external public including
potential clients, investors, and regulators. In addition, the current study does not directly
examine the association between auditor impression management and clients’ perceptions
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of auditor independence. Future research could employ experiments to investigate the
causality of auditors’ marketing language and decision makers’ perceptions and their
auditor choices. The current study examines audit procurement practices by state audit
agencies (i.e., an independent party). Future research examining this topic could focus on
procurement conducted by audited government entities (i.e., auditee) and investigate
whether desirable audit quality attributes that predict auditor selection would be different
if the role of decision makers changes. Although the current study does not find an
association between the environment factors and audit procurement quality, future
research can explore other factors (i.e., auditee characteristics) which may influence the
effectiveness of audit procurement practices.
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Appendix
Development of Word Lists and Dictionary Validation Process
I followed Pennebaker et al.'s (2007) procedures 39 to validate the linguistic
constructs. These included the following steps to develop an initial list of words for each
word category identified in Table 2.2 and 2.4 and to validate the developed dictionaries
through a survey instrument.
Step 1: Use test observations (i.e., audit proposals) to develop an initial list of words.
Five test observations were randomly selected from the dataset of 363 observations. I
reviewed those five files and removed content to generate an analyzable text file of the
proposals. Removed content include cover page, table of contents, images, tables, charts,
engagement personnel resume, client references, peer review report, and standard forms
required by request-for-proposal (RFP) documents. The removed information is related to
either boilerplate (recurring) text from RFP documents (e.g., restatements of text from the
RFP) or will be captured by other quantitative measures.
Using an online text analyzer provided by Online-Utility.org 40, I created a word
frequency table for each cleaned text file. I then developed initial lists of words for the
word categories by reviewing the frequency tables and assigning a word to its
corresponding word category. I further expanded the word lists based on several relevant
sources, including AICPA Code of Profession Conduct, Organizational Trust Inventory
Scale (Cummings and Bromiley 1996), the Pinto and Pinto Cooperation scale (Pinto and
Pinto 1990), and online English dictionaries (i.e., Thesaurus.com).
Step 2: Hire independent judges to validate the reliability of the word dictionaries
Accounting professionals were recruited to review the preliminary word lists and
complete a survey instrument, which requires them to assess the word lists. The
instrument consisted of two tasks: Inclusion and Matching. Participants reviewed a
definition table for the attributes of interest and had to pass five knowledge check
questions before proceeding to the following tasks. Participants completed these two
tasks in random order.
1. Inclusion: in this task, judges first reviewed several word lists grouped by category
and then decided whether a word in an assigned category should be included or not.
Specifically, they determined whether to (1) add words to the category and/or (2)
remove an existing word from the category.

39

This article is published by LIWC.net, Austin, Texas 78703 USA in conjunction with the LIWC2007
software program.
40
This website provides several free online software utilities, such as readability calculator and text
analyzer, and can be found at http://www.online-utility.org/text/analyzer.jsp

103

2. Matching: in this task, judges reviewed an alphabetized word list and assigned each
word in the list to a corresponding category. In addition to the identified word
categories, a "none of the above" option is also given.
Step 3: Analyze the survey responses
I received nine responses from three professors and six accounting professionals from
state audit agencies. To test the degree of agreement among the judges, I performed the
following analyses:
1. Performed a correlation analysis of the inclusion data to identify the judges whose
responses are highly correlated with the others. Next, I ranked the judges by the sum
of their correlation coefficients.
2. Paired judges and, for each pair, converted the matching data to a score of 0 or 1 (1=
judges have the same response for a word assignment; 0= otherwise). Summed the
scores for each judge and calculated the degree of the agreement among the judges as
a percentage (i.e., a judge's score/60 41). I also ranked the judges by their agreement
percentage.
3. Based on the judges' rank in the tasks and taking their work experience and number of
proposals reviewed into consideration, I created two pools of judges - one includes 7
judges (the top 7) and the other includes 4 judges (the top 4). The following table
shows data for these pools.
Pool 1

Pool 2

3 professors and 4
professionals

1 professor and 3
professionals

Average r for inclusion data

0.41

0.53

Average % (degree of agreement)
for converted matching data

56%

61%

Average # of proposals reviewed

10.1

14.3

Min # of proposals reviewed /
judge

3

6

# of years of work experience

24.4

22.5

Members

41

If a judge's responses completely agree with others', this judge will receive a total score of 60 (1 for each
word matching).
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Step 4: Finalize the word lists based on survey responses
I created three sets of word dictionaries. Set A is based on Pool 1 responses; Set B is
based on Pool 2 responses; Sec C is based on 5 observations of audit proposals (the
original word lists). I used the following criteria in developing Set A and B.
1. A word is assigned to a category based on the majority of the judges' responses (i.e.,
mode) across both the inclusion and matching tasks.
2. If the majority of the judges voted against including a word in a category in the
inclusion task, (i.e., the votes for inclusion are 3 or fewer), then I assigned the word to
a category using the judges' responses in the matching task.
3. An inconsistency occurs when the modal category, across tasks (inclusion, matching),
differs. In these cases, I summed the judges' votes across the tasks (hence n = 14, i.e.,
7x2) and assigned the word to the modal category across votes. When there is a tie,
i.e., when there were equal votes, counting votes across the matching and inclusion
task, I used the judges' responses in the matching task since the matching task
requires an explicit choice of category, whereas the inclusion task requires only
agreement with a pre-assigned category (i.e., judges had to drag a word to a category
instead of simply clicking Yes or No).
4. For set B, when there was a tie across the matching and inclusion votes, I followed
the same logic as is described above for Set A, only using the data in set B to resolve
the tie. This occurred in 1 out of 62 cases. In cases where the set B data did not allow
for the resolution of ties, I used the procedure for set A, and the Set A data, to resolve
the tie. This occurred in 2 out of 62 cases.
5. Compared with the original word lists, Set C, there are 16 differences with Set A, and,
14 differences with Set B.
Step 5: Test the internal reliability of the dictionaries
To test the internal reliability of the specific words within each category, I followed
Pennebaker et al.'s (LIWC2007) procedures to calculate Cronbach alphas, both the binary
and raw/uncorrected alphas, for each category. For each word dictionary (Set A, B, and
C), I created a dictionary file for each word category. Next, I ran LIWC with the
dictionary files and used the LIWC outputs to calculate Cronbach alphas in SPSS. The
raw or uncorrected alphas are based on the percentage of use of each of the category
words within the texts. The binary alphas are computed on the occurrence/nonoccurrence of each dictionary word (i.e., converting the usage of each of the dictionary
words within a given text into either a 0 (not used) or a 1 (used one or more times)).
Based on the results of the Cronbach test, I used the dictionary Set B in my text analysis
in this study. The Cronbach alphas reported in Table 2.2 and 2.4 are based on dictionary
B.
Copyright © Yu-Tzu Chang 2015
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